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Law in Flux: Philosophical Hermeneutics,
Legal Argumentation, and the Natural
Law Tradition
Francis J. Mootz, 1I*
I. INTRODUCTION
Peter Goodrich describes the plight of contemporary legal theory
with concise accuracy: We have abandoned natural law foundations
originally constructed in ecclesiastical venues only to find that the
project of developing a secular legal language capable of
transforming the management of social conflict into questions of
technical rationality is doomed to failure.' The ascendancy of
analytic legal positivism has purchased conceptual rigor at the cost of
separating the analysis of legal validity from moral acceptability, but
retreat from this stale conceptualism and a return to traditional
natural law precepts appears wildly implausible. As a sympathetic
critic recently concluded, natural law remains "a curiosity outside the
mainstream, regarded mostly as a side-show and not to be taken very
seriously."2  The irrelevance of the natural law tradition in
* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. I am grateful for the
research stipend and sabbatical leave provided by Western New England College and Dean
Donald Dunn during the time that this Article was written. This Article originally was
presented at the First Annual Meeting of the Working Group on Law, Culture and the
Humanities, convened at Georgetown University, March 27-29, 1998. I would like to thank my
fellow panelists, George Wright, Robert Miner, and George Taylor, for their comments and
suggestions. I would like to extend special thanks to Lloyd Weinreb for his encouraging
comments, and to Step Feldman for pushing me to articulate more clearly the purpose of
pursuing this project.
1. See PETER GOODRICH, LAW IN THE COURTS OF LOVE: LITERATURE AND OTHER
MINOR JURISPRUDENCES 160-61 (1996).
2. Lloyd L. Weinreb, The Moral Point of View, in NATURAL LAW, LIBERALISM AND
MORALITY 195, 195 (Robert P. George ed., 1996) [hereinafter Weinreb, Moral Point]; see also
Philip Soper, Some Natural Confusions About Natural Law, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2393, 2394
(1992) ("Natural law seems to evoke a degree of skepticism in our society that forces any
theory that goes by the name to confront a higher burden of proof than is placed on other,
more familiar theories") (emphasis in original). Weinreb remains optimistic that the natural
law tradition merits renewed close study despite its continuing secondary status in
1
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contemporary jurisprudential discourse would appear to be sealed by
the "interpretive turn" in legal theory, which in its most general
outline asserts that universal and eternal principles have been
replaced by hermeneutical fluidity and historical contingency. In the
wake of the interpretive turn it is reasonable to expect that legal
theorists will turn not to the natural law tradition, but to radical
postmodern and deconstructive styles of theorizing in their effort to
move beyond legal positivism. The natural law tradition appears to
be hopelessly confused and anachronistic in the brave new world of
postmodern legal theory, in which law is constrained neither by an
objective moral order of nature nor by the logical rigor of conceptual
analysis and sociological description
My thesis is that the interpretive turn in legal theory works as a
critique of legal positivism in at least one surprising way: by
reinvigorating (even if in dramatically new form) the natural law
tradition.' This thesis is grounded in three presuppositions. First,
Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics provides the
most sophisticated and persuasive account of the "interpretive turn."
Second, Gadamer's hermeneutics illuminates the activity of legal
practice and correlatively that legal theorists provide important
jurisprudential discourse. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, The Case for Natural Law Reexamined-1993,
38 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 1 (1993) [hereinafter Weinreb, Case].
3. Pierre Schlag has developed the most radical postmodern criticism of legal thought.
Schlag attacks the normative character of legal thinking as an undesirable if not
counterproductive aesthetic. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN.
L. REv. 167 (1990); Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 801
(1991). Schlag also challenges the assumption buried deep within normative legal thinking that
a coherent, rational subject exists as the addressee of normative legal thinking. See Pierre
Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1627 (1991). Most recently, Schlag has
reformulated his position by meditating on the law's fixation with reason and the stultifying
effects that this has on social life. See PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON
(1998).
4. As Chair of the Section on Law and Interpretation for the Association of American Law
Schools (AALS), I conceived and organized a panel presentation to address the topic "Natural
Law After the Interpretive Turn" at the 1997 AALS Annual Meeting. The papers delivered by
Georgia Warnke and Kent Greenawalt frame the issue that I intend to address in this article:
Can Gadamer's invocation of Aristotle's natural law be reconciled with his thoroughly
historical conception of human understanding? See Georgia Warnke, Law, Hermeneutics, and
Public Debate, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 395 (1997) [hereinafter Warnke, Law] (arguing that
Gadamer's attention to the identity of a common object such as a legal text and also to the
changing situations that affect how this object is understood reflects an approach close to
Aristotle's conception of natural law); Kent Greenawalt, Interpretation and Judgment, 9 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 415, 433 (1997) (questioning whether a natural law account is plausible if we
adopt the premise that human understanding is substantially shaped by the cultural history and
context, since a "view that transcultural elements are inextricable from culturally partial
perspectives gravely compromises the likely utility of natural law"); and Georgia Warnke,
Reply to Greenawalt, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 437, 440 (1997) [hereinafter Warnke, Reply]
(responding by asserting that to "say some of our differences [in moral judgment] reflect
legitimate differences in understanding [between two cultures] does not presume that all our
differences are legitimate or that we cannot rationally discriminate between culturally based
understandings").
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contextual work that reinforces Gadamer's philosophical themes.
Third, the natural law tradition serves as a particularly productive
point of contact between Gadamer's philosophy and legal theory.
Because each of these points merits a book-length treatment, my
discussion of these foundational questions necessarily will be
schematic and suggestive. In this essay I plan only to adumbrate my
general claim that natural law philosophy and philosophical
hermeneutics have significant points of convergence that merit
further study.
I anticipate an immediate objection that natural law philosophy is
a tradition better left at the margins of discourse. Even if the current
desuetude of natural law philosophy is mistaken as a matter of
intellectual history, critics will properly ask what can be gained by
pursuing reinvigoration. My answer is straightforward. Natural law,
understood in terms of my hermeneutically-inspired reading of the
tradition, is a feature of legal practice. I will demonstrate that Justice
Souter's concurring opinion in the recent "right to die" cases before
the Supreme Court is best understood as a performance within this
living tradition. Moreover, by marginalizing avowed natural law
scholars such as Lon Fuller and, more recently, Lloyd Weinreb,
contemporary legal theorists have lost important voices that have
contributed substantially (although not expressly) to the discourse of
contemporary legal hermeneutics. Reinvigorating the natural law
tradition is just reinvigorating contemporary legal philosophy.
I begin by describing Gadamer's hermeneutical philosophy and the
special role that his analysis of legal understanding plays in his
broader project. Using Chaim Perelman's emphasis on rhetorical
philosophy as a complementary point of reference, I place particular
emphasis on Gadamer's exploration of legal practice as a
hermeneutical activity of argumentation. Legal practice is a
reasonable activity, I argue, because it is structured to facilitate
rhetorical knowledge. I then supplement the rhetorical-
hermeneutical conception of legal practice that emerges from my
discussion of Gadamer and Perelman by describing how each
philosopher appropriates natural law concepts at important points in
his analysis, and I outline the features of the classical natural law
approach that they revive.
In Part III of the Article, I argue that my analysis of the rhetoric of
legal argumentation illuminates the non-traditional natural law
accounts offered by legal scholars Lon Fuller and Lloyd Weinreb,
and that what appears at first to be paradoxical turns out to be quite
reasonable: The classical natural law tradition proves to be a rich
resource for developing a hermeneutical account of law and legal
practice. I illustrate my discussion by demonstrating that Fuller's
1999] 313
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famous hypothetical case, The Speluncean Explorers, and Weinreb's
analysis of the justice of affirmative action reinforce Gadamer's
themes. I conclude that the natural law philosophies developed by
Fuller and Weinreb are best viewed as elaborating the implications
of philosophical hermeneutics in the context of legal theory.
My interdisciplinary inquiry is not hierarchical, inasmuch as I
intend both to confirm Gadamer's unquestioned significance for
legal theory and to demonstrate how contemporary developments in
legal theory can make important contributions to the project of
developing Gadamer's insights. My working premise is one of
Gadamer's hallmark themes: We must combine our study of the
universality of the hermeneutic situation with the contextual study of
particular life practices such as law if we are to facilitate human
understanding. In the end, it is neither philosophical hermeneutics
nor natural law philosophy that is instructive, but rather the
unsettling and challenging dialogic encounter between the two.
II. GADAMER ON THE RHETORIC OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION
A. Philosophical Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Model of
Conversation
Hermeneutics traditionally involved the study of reliable methods
for interpreting opaque texts. Gadamer's hermeneutics is
philosophical because it abandons the focus on methodological rules
and instead analyzes the unitary hermeneutical situation that
subtends all human knowledge, including the methodologically-
secured empirical knowledge of positive science. Philosophical
hermeneutics rests on the ontological claim that all understanding
results from a decentering "fusion of horizons" in which a
"prejudiced" individual confronts a text or other person in an
"experience" that disrupts her presumed insularity.5 This account
poses a radical challenge to the Enlightenment model of a
5. I have examined Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics in the context of legal theory in
some detail in prior articles, and so I will not repeat that analysis here. See Francis J. Mootz,
III, Legal Classics: After Deconstructing the Legal Canon, 72 N.C. L. REV. 977 (1994)
[hereinafter Mootz, Legal Classics]; Francis J. Mootz, III, The Ontological Basis of Legal
Hermeneutics: A Proposed Model of Inquiry Based on the Work of Gadamer, Habermas and
Ricoeur, 68 B.U. L. REV. 523 (1988); Francis J. Mootz, III, Rethinking the Rule of Law: A
Demonstration That the Obvious is Plausible, 61 TENN. L. REV. 69 (1993) [hereinafter Mootz,
Rethinking]; Francis J. Mootz, III, Rhetorical Knowledge in Legal Practice and Theory, 6 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 491 (1998) [hereinafter Mootz, Rhetorical Knowledge]. Excellent
assessments of the relevance of philosophical hermeneutics to legal philosophy include: LEGAL
HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1990); Stephen M.
Feldman, The New Metaphysics: The Interpretive Turn in Jurisprudence, 76 IOwA L. REV. 661
(1991); Stephen M. Feldman, Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 679.
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disinterested observer gathering data about an entirely distinct
external world. Gadamer's phenomenological account of the
hermeneutical experience draws upon the familiar experience of a
conversation. By this account, all understanding occurs as the
product of the give-and-take experiences of the interpreter within a
given historical and social situation. It is neither trite nor imprecise
to conclude that Gadamer believes that human understanding is
conversational in nature.
By using the experience of everyday conversation to explain his
philosophy, Gadamer signals the tremendous importance of the
rhetorical tradition to his approach, even though his explicit
discussions of rhetoric might at first appear to be peripheral.7
Gadamer begins Truth and Method by recalling Vico's development
of the humanistic concept of sensus communis as a means of
preserving the independent validity of moral-practical wisdom, as
distinguished from the logical-empirical truths of science Gadamer
6. Gadamer writes:
Conversation is a process of coming to an understanding. Thus it belongs to every true
conversation that each person opens himself to the other, truly accepts his point of view
as valid and transposes himself into the other to such an extent that he understands not
the particular individual but what he says.
HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 385, 388 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald
Marshall trans., Crossroad 2d rev. ed. 1989) (1960). Gadamer returns to the metaphor of
conversation to explain all understanding:
[When interpreting a text] the interpreter's own horizon is decisive, yet not as a personal
standpoint that he maintains or enforces, but more as an opinion and a possibility that
one brings into play and puts at risk, and that helps one truly to make one's own what the
text says.... We can now see that this is what takes place in conversation, in which
something is expressed that is not only mine or my author's, but common.
Id.
7. Acknowledging that his guiding focus on the "event" of understanding is drawn from
"an ancient truth that has been able to assert itself against modem scientific methodology,"
Gadamer concludes that the "eikos, the versimilar, the 'probable' ... the 'evident,' belong in a
series of things that defend their rightness against the truth and certainty of what is proved and
known. Let us recall that we assigned a special importance [in developing our hermeneutical
philosophy] to the sensus communis." Id. at 485. In his review of Truth and Method, Klaus
Dockhorn suggests that Gadamer underestimates the extent to which the rhetorical tradition
underwrites his project, yet nevertheless he declares that the "widespread depreciation or
dismissal of rhetoric.., should be effectively brought to an end by this book." Klaus
Dockhorn, Hans-Georg Gadamer's Truth and Method, 13 PHIL. & RHETORIC 160, 160 (1980).
Jean Grondin places particular emphasis on Gadamer's use of the rhetorical tradition to
elucidate "a concept of truth that remains aware of its attachment to human finitude." Jean
Grondin, Hermeneutics and Relativism, in FESTIVALS OF INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS ON
HANs-GEORG GADAMER'S WORK 42, 49 (Kathleen Wright ed., 1990). Generally, however,
the invocation of the rhetorical tradition in Truth and Method has been overlooked by
commentators. A recent exception is found in Donald Phillip Verene, Gadamer and Vico on
Sensus Communis and the Tradition of Humane Knowledge, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF
HANS-GEORG GADAMER 137 (Lewis Edwin Hahn ed., 1997).
8. See GADAMER, supra note 6, at 19-24. John Schaeffer argues that if Gadamer had more
explicitly adopted a rhetorical account in accord with Vico's model he could have successfully
responded to Jirgen Habermas's challenges without surrendering critical theory. See JOHN D.
SCHAEFFER, SENSUS COMMUNIS: VIco, RHETORIC, AND THE LIMITS OF RELATIVISM 117-22
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aligns Vico with the substantive rhetorical goal of "saying the right
thing well," and applauds his development of the "positive ambiguity
of the rhetorical ideal."9 He attributes Vico's importance to Vico's
prescient challenge to the unitary Cartesian paradigm of knowledge
by re-asserting "the independent rights of rhetoric... the art of
finding arguments [which] serves to develop the sense of what is
convincing, which works instinctively and ex tempore, and for that
very reason cannot be replaced by science."'" The rhetorical tradition
preserved and advanced by Vico concerns a way of understanding no
less legitimate or important than the methodological model of the
natural sciences. Indeed, Gadamer asserts that rhetoric "is the
universal form of human communication, which even today
determines our social life in an incomparably more profound fashion
than does science."" Consequently, at a key juncture in the
conclusion of Truth and Method, Gadamer reminds us that his book
principally has been concerned with recovering and rehabilitating
this rhetorical model of knowledge. 2 As one commentator recently
concluded, Gadamer is not advocating that we elevate rhetorical
study over philosophy as much as insisting on the rhetorical nature of
all humanistic inquiry, including philosophy. 3
Gadamer relates ancient rhetoric to his inquiry into our pre-
(1990).
9. GADAMER, supra note 6, at 21. Gadamer is principally concerned with overcoming the
effects of 19th-century historicism and romanticism in German philosophy, but he begins his
book by recalling that Vico was the last thinker to hold to the ancient truths of the rhetorical
tradition:
Vico's return to the Roman concept of the sensus communis, and his defense of humanist
rhetoric against modern science, is of special interest to us, for here we are introduced to
an element of truth in the human sciences that was no longer recognizable when they
conceptualized themselves in the nineteenth century. Vico lived in an unbroken tradition
of rhetorical and humanist culture, and had only to reassert anew its ageless claim.
Ultimately, it has always been known that the possibilities of rational proof and
instruction do not fully exhaust the sphere of knowledge. Hence Vico's appeal to the
sensus communis belongs, as we have seen, in a wider context that goes right back to
antiquity and whose continued effect into the present day is our theme.
Id. at 23-24.
10. Id. at 19-20.
11. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, THE- RELEVANCE OF THE BEAUTIFUL AND OTHER ESSAYS
17 (Robert Bernascon ed. & Nicholas Walker trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1986) (1977).
12. See GADAMER, supra note 6, at 485.
13. See G.B. MADISON, THE HERMENEUrICs OF POSTMODERN1TY: FIGURES AND
THEMEs 164 (1990). Gadamer's topic is the independent significance of humanistic
understanding and a critique of the illegitimate extensions of the scientistic ideology of neo-
Kantianism, and so he might be misinterpreted as advancing the claim that natural science and
the humanities constitute two distinct cultures of inquiry. However, Gadamer makes clear in
the revised edition of Truth and Method that the revolution in the philosophy of science in the
years following publication of the book justifies the conclusion that scientific practice is a
hermeneutical and rhetorical activity no less than philosophy, although natural science is a
different kind of comportment within this hermeneutical arena. See GADAMER, supra note 6,
at 283.
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methodological, traditional complex of meanings, but he is careful to
distinguish substantive rhetoric, as exemplified in Plato's Phaedrus,
from the "idle speculations of the sophists."' 4 Gadamer argues that
genuine rhetoric concerns the "discovery and transmission of insight
and knowledge," an event that he reminds us is exemplified in the
"art of leading a conversation.""5 The ancient rhetoricians well
understood that the cultural "common sense" serving as a
background for all understanding is nourished not on
methodologically secured truths, but rather on the "probable" as
articulated in contingent and historically defined knowledge. The
role that rhetoric played in nourishing the political society of the
ancient Greek polis is paralleled today by the sustaining power of
our hermeneutical experience. Gadamer sees his task as applying the
rhetorical idea of political truth grounded on the probable to the
hermeneutical experience of interpretive appropriation and
understanding. 6
Today, the legal system-which is premised on the production and
interpretation of authoritative texts as sources of governing
authority-is a prominent venue for this hermeneutical experience,
since the performance and reception of speeches before all
competent citizens of the polis no longer occurs. Every attempt to
understand a legal text, Gadamer insists, is a function of applying the
text to the case at hand; thus, he regards legal reasoning as a
particularly vivid model of all hermeneutical understanding. 7 He
rejects the scientific impulse to reduce law to a disciplined
methodology of deductive application, regarding this as a project
14. GADAMER, supra note 11, at 19. Gadamer links ancient rhetoric with the lived
experience of the lifeworld in HANS-GEORG GADAMER, REASON IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE
119-22 (Frederick G. Lawrence trans., MIT Press 1992) (1979) [hereinafter GADAMER,
REASON]; and Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Expressive Power of Language, 107 PMLA 348, 350
(1992) [hereinafter Gadamer, Expressive Power]. It is important not to misunderstand
Gadamer's invocation of Plato as an attempt to invest rhetoric with the qualities of certain and
unchanging truth. Gadamer places much greater emphasis on Plato's activity-writing the
Socratic dialogues-than on Plato's philosophical self-understanding. See HANS-GEORG
GADAMER, HANS-GEORG GADAMER ON EDUCATION, POETRY, AND HISTORY: APPLIED
HERMENEUTICS 71 (Dieter Misgeld & Graeme Nicholson eds. & Lawrence Schmidt & Monica
Reuss trans., SUNY Press 1992) ("It is more important to find the words which convince the
other than those which can be demonstrated in their truth, once and for all. We can learn this
from the Platonic dialogues."). See generally HANS-GEORG GADAMER, DIALOGUE AND
DIALECTIC: EIGHT HERMENEUTICAL STUDIES ON PLATO (P. Christopher Smith ed. & trans.,
Yale Univ. Press 1980).
15. Gadamer, Expressive Power, supra note 14, at 348.
16. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 23-24 (David E.
Linge ed. & trans., Univ. Cal. Press 1976) ("Convincing and persuading, without being able to
prove-these are obviously as much the aim and measure of understanding and interpretation
as they are the aim and measure of the art of oration and persuasion").
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destined to fail because of the impossibility of bridging the chasm
between the presumed universal and timeless meaning of the text
and the demands of individual cases. The model of conversation
proves to be especially illuminating in this context: An interpreter
understands what a legal text is saying by suppressing her subjective
designs and allowing the text to speak to the question posed by the
case at hand. The model of conversation also underscores the
rhetorical nature of legal practice: An interpreter can understand a
text best by allowing it to speak to the question posed by the case at
hand, rather than by charting in advance the line of inquiry, just as a
rhetorician must be attuned to her audience. The interpreter does
not adopt a subjective attitude of dominance over the text, but rather
suppresses her subjective aims and attends to "the saying" of the
historically effective text as it is revealed in particular circumstances.
Law holds authority, Gadamer believes, because it is the practice of
hermeneutically appropriating governing texts to current disputes.
Gadamer's understanding of authority is best understood by
attending to one of his most challenging discussions-the role of
"classical" texts in the Western intellectual tradition. 8 Gadamer
clearly rejects the view that classical texts have achieved their
preeminent status because they capture essential features of human
nature and therefore embody invariable truths. Nevertheless, he
argues that classical texts do bear the authority of tradition.
Tradition holds authority, Gadamer argues, not because it locks us in
a coercive ideological vise or because we choose to follow its
dictates, but because it has weight in the manner that we conduct our
lives. 9 The authority of tradition is not a self-contained power
transmitted through a textual vessel and then passively absorbed by
the reader; instead, the authority of tradition is generated anew with
each reading of the text." The authority-or truth-of tradition
derives from its continuing critical appropriation, in which we
distinguish the "legitimate prejudices" that enable understanding
from the unproductive prejudices that warp understanding. 1
Contemporary readers always approach the classical text with a fore-
structure of understanding that motivates their encounter with the
18. For an extended discussion of Gadamer's analysis of the classic and its application to
legal theory, see Mootz, Legal Classics, supra note 5.
19. See GADAMER, supra note 6, at 277-85.
20. See id. at xxxvii (arguing that his critics fail to recognize that he never equates
understanding with the naive appropriation of "customary opinions" or "what tradition has
sanctified"). Gadamer emphasizes that he rejects the view "that the 'classical work' is
accessible only in a hopelessly conventional way or that it encourages a reassuringly
harmonious conception of the 'universally human."' Id. at 577.
21. Id. at 277, 298-99.
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text, but the classical text can "break the spell of our own fore-
meanings" (without eliminating them) by pulling us up short and
initiating further dialogical questioning.2 Although there is always a
"multiplicity of what can be thought" about a text, Gadamer stresses
that "not everything is possible" if the classical text is permitted to
"present itself in all its otherness and thus assert its own truth against
one's own fore-meanings."' The classics do not stand outside of
history as supra-historical norms, then, but they do facilitate an
experience of the truth of tradition by engaging contemporary
readers and causing them to reassess their preunderstandings.24
Gadamer concludes that "putting at risk" is the guiding normative
implication of his philosophy, emphasizing that "hermeneutic
philosophy understands itself not as an absolute position but as a
way of experience. It insists that there is no higher principle than
holding oneself open in a conversation."2 Georgia Warnke argues
that this normative implication of Gadamer's philosophy underwrites
a new account of justice. Abandoning the fiction of a consensual
social contract as the source of political legitimation, she promotes a
hermeneutical account of justice as a "fair and equal hermeneutic
discussion" that accepts the reality of "disagreements between
equally well-justified interpretations" of the substantive
requirements of a just society.26 It is important not to misread
Warnke as conceding an "anything goes" relativism. Warnke
emphasizes that even if many interpretations can be equally justified
on formal grounds, we should not discount the idea of coming to an
understanding in social discourse that one interpretation is better
than the others for present purposes, even if that judgment cannot be
compelled under formal logic or attributed to a hypothetical
consensus of all rational persons.27 The key hermeneutic insight is
22. Id. at 268.
23. Id. at 269.
24. Gadamer argues that the classics are classics in virtue of their conversational qualities,
not the unimpeachable character of their message:
It is impossible to make ourselves aware of a prejudice while it is constantly operating
unnoticed, but only when it is, so to speak, provoked. The encounter with a traditionary
text can provide this provocation .... [This event] has the logical structure of a question.
The essence of the question is to open up possibilities and keep them open.... In fact
our own prejudice is properly brought into play by being put at risk.
Id. at 299. The traditionary texts that regularly provoke readers in this way become classics, not
because they have been so designated, but because that is their cultural function.
25. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL APPRENTICESHIPS: ON THE ORIGINS OF
PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 189 (Robert K. Sullivan trans., MIT Press 1985) (1977).
26. GEORGIA WARNKE, JUSTICE AND INTERPRETATION at 12, viii (1992).
27. Warnke argues that this yields theoretical insight as well as pragmatic political
guidance:
To say that some of our differences [in moral understanding] reflect legitimate
1999]
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that the better interpretation is always contextual and historical,
always is rhetorically advanced, and never achieves the status of a
timeless logical truth.'
B. Perelman's New Rhetoric and the Primacy of Argumentation
Because he does not develop a pragmatic account of rhetorical
exchange, Gadamer's phenomenology of understanding remains
somewhat vague with respect to the activities by which people
pursue justice and morality in the course of daily life. Chaim
Perelman's efforts to reclaim the wisdom of ancient rhetoric proves
to be a helpful supplement to Gadamer's hermeneutics for purposes
of developing an account of rhetorical knowledge in law. Perelman
demonstrated in his first book that arguments about the dictates of
justice could not be rational since they did not accord with formal
logic. Confronted by this bizarre yet inescapable conclusion,
Perelman rejected the Cartesian philosophical tradition from which
it issued and set for himself the task of identifying the means by
which it is possible to secure adherence to reasonable claims
regarding the requirements of justice.29
Working from Aristotle's rhetorical philosophy, Perelman argues
that it is necessary to distinguish rational truths from reasonable
arguments. The concept of the rational "is associated with self-
evident truths and compelling reasoning" and therefore "is valid only
in a theoretical domain,"' whereas to reason with another person "is
not merely to verify and demonstrate, but also to deliberate, to
differences in understanding does not presume that all our differences are legitimate or
that we cannot rationally discriminate between culturally based understandings. Rather,
there is an alternative to both the relativistic idea that any understanding of law or
principle is legitimate and the dogmatic idea that only one is. Some different legitimate
understandings of moral and legal principles remain possible and we might try to
accommodate this pluralism both in our debates and, as far as possible, in our policies.
Warnke, Reply, supra note 4, at 440.
28. Warnke elaborates:
The important question, then, is no longer which interpretation of our history and
experience is correct because none is exhaustively correct. The important question is,
rather, how or why our interpretations differ and what new insights into the meaning of
our traditions we might glean from the attempt to understand the cogency of
interpretations different from our own.
... Both diversity and dialogue, then, are necessary, not because we could be wrong,
but because we can never be wholly correct or rather because the issue is no longer as
much one of rightness or wrongness as one of continuing revision and reform.
WARNKE, supra note 26, at 132, 137.
29. See CHAIM PERELMAN, THE NEW RHETORIC AND THE HUMANITIES: ESSAYS ON
RHETORIC AND ITS APPLICATIONS 112 (William Kluback et al. trans., D. Reidel Publishing
Co. 1979); see also Edgar Bodenheimer, Perelman's Contribution to Legal Methodology, 12 N.
KY. L. REv. 392, 392-403 (1985).
30. PERELMAN, supra note 29, at 118.
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criticize and to justify, to give reasons for and against-in a word, to
argue."3 The existence of competing arguments does not necessarily
mean that at least one of the participants has engaged in defective
thinking or that the matter admits only of irrational adherence.
Perelman demonstrates that argumentation has its own logic that can
foster reasonable action even in the face of a case that is undecidable
under Cartesian strictures of rationality. As a prime example,
Perelman points to the operation of the legal system in which
arguments are made and action is taken despite the inevitable lack of
indubitable knowledge about the questions raised by the case at
hand.32
Rhetorical claims seek to persuade an audience with arguments
that proceed from pre-understandings shared by the rhetor and her
audience. Presupposed agreement among the parties is a necessary
feature of every act of persuasion because there can be no recourse
to justifications that exist outside the unfolding historical situation in
which both speaker and listener are enmeshed. Because the
historical context alone provides grounds for deciding between two
reasonable alternatives, Perelman spends the better part of his
treatise cataloging the techniques for employing accepted loci, by
which he means "topics" or "commonplaces," as points of departure
when seeking adherence through argumentation.33 These topics have
presumptive authority because they are unavoidable, but they
remain subject to revision and development in the course of
reasoned elaboration with respect to particular problems. For
example, making an appeal to "equality" in political discourse is
successful only because there is a deeply shared agreement that
equality is a worthy goal, but articulating the requirements of
equality in a given case varies with changing social and economic
settings in a manner that leads to different conceptions of "equality."
Perelman argues that the ideal of justice is the quintessential
commonplace of political dialogue. He insists that justice is a
"confused notion" that cannot be clarified according to the test of
absolute truth but can only be developed in the course of responding
31. CHAIM PERELMAN, JUSTICE, LAW, AND ARGUMENT: ESSAYS ON MORAL AND LEGAL
REASONING 59 (John Petrie et al. trans., D. Reidel Publishing Co. 1980); cf Philip Selznick,
The Idea ofa Communitarian Morality, 75 CAL. L. REv. 445, 463 (1987) ("The ideologue seeks
an iron logic. Who says A, he thunders, must say B. But that is not the only way to act in
accord with principle. There is a difference between the coherence of ideas, so dear to
philosophers, and the coherence of our lives or the coherence of practical judgment.").
32. See PERELMAN, supra note 31, at 129; see also Donald H.J. Hermann, Legal Reasoning
as Argumentation, 12 N. KY. L. REv. 467 (1985).
33. CHAIM PERELMAN & LUcI OLBRECHTS-TYTECA PERELMAN, THE NEW RHETORIC:
A TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION 83-85 (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., Univ.
Notre Dame Press 1969) (1958) (defining loci).
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to the practical demands of political action in a manner informed by
reasonable belief.' Perelman stresses that he is making a broad
epistemological claim rather than a pragmatic political one: What
holds true for the topic of justice holds true for all philosophical
inquiry. Philosophy is just thinking about confused notions;
consequently, philosophers cannot reach definitive conclusions
except in the most narrowly defined circumstances. The goal of the
"new rhetoric" movement is not to produce a handbook of certain
technical, forensic skills used in public speaking; it represents a
philosophical claim about how we reason.35 Perelman joins Gadamer
in regarding legal argumentation as a model for philosophical
inquiry-particularly moral philosophy-and therefore looks to the
social practice of legal argumentation to derive important theoretical
insights:
After having sought, for centuries, to model philosophy on the
sciences, and having considered each of its particularities as a
sign of inferiority, perhaps the moment has come to consider
that philosophy has many traits in common with law. A
confrontation with the latter would permit better understanding
of the specificity of philosophy, a discipline which is elaborated
under the aegis of reason, but a reason which is essentially
practical, turned toward rational decision and action. '
By looking to the practical engagement in law rather than to the
abstract model of theory as a guide, philosophers can recover the
experience of moral argumentation:
[T]he diverse principles which the philosophers have presented
as supreme norms in ethics are in reality only commonplaces, in
the meaning of classical rhetoric, that they give reasons which
are to be considered in each concrete situation rather than as
axioms like those of geometry whose consequences can be
drawn by simple deduction. Practical reasoning, applicable in
morality, must not be inspired by the mathematical model,
which is not applicable in changing circumstances, but by a
knowledge characterized by reasonableness and by the taking
into consideration diverse aspirations and multiple interests,
34. PERELMAN, supra note 31, at vii ("As justice is, for me, the prime example of a
'confused notion,' of a notion which, like many philosophical concepts, cannot be reduced to
clarity without being distorted, one cannot treat it without recourse to the methods of
reasoning analyzed by the new rhetoric."); see generally id. at 96-105; PERELMAN &
PERELMAN, supra note 33, at 133-41.
35. See generally PERELMAN, supra note 29 (applying the New Rhetoric to philosophy,
literary theory, history, morality, and scientific methodology to demonstrate the importance of
the rehabilitation of the "reasonable" to the humanities).
36. PERELMAN, supra note 31, at 174.
12
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol11/iss2/3
Mootz
defined by Aristotle as phronesis or prudence, and which is so
brilliantly manifested in law, in Roman jurisprudentia. 37
Perelman hearkens back to antiquity for good reason, since law has
succumbed to scientism and rationalism no less than to philosophy:
If law has suffered much from being too influenced by the
sciences, I believe the same reproach can be addressed to
philosophy .... If the new concept of law spreads, which is
basically a very old one, and which has been forgotten for
centuries, philosophers will have much to learn from it. They
will look to the techniques of the jurist to learn how to reason
about values, how to realize an equilibrium, how to bring about
a synthesis of values.3"
Perelman's rhetorical philosophy clearly has affinities with
Gadamer's hermeneutics and its similar attention to legal practice
and the rhetorical tradition. Gadamer acknowledges at several points
in his work that Perelman has made an important contribution to the
project of rehabilitating the full-bodied scope of ancient rhetoric.39
C. Reason as Rhetorical Knowledge
Read together, Gadamer and Perelman describe a social process
and an epistemic goal that is most accurately termed "rhetorical
knowledge." Rhetorical knowledge can be defined as the effort of
two or more persons working together creatively to refashion the
linguistically structured symbols of social cohesion that serve as the
resources for intersubjective experience with the aim of motivating
action of some kind. This activity is at once hermeneutical and
rhetorical, for it involves both discernment and expression, both
understanding and proposing, and both active listening and
speaking.' Rhetorical knowledge is a practical achievement that
37. Id. at 119.
38. Id. at 146. The collection of essays repeats this theme throughout. See id; see also Alan
H. Goldman, Legal Reasoning as a Model for Moral Reasoning, 8 LAW & PHIL. 131,139 (1989)
("Moral reasoning, despite a difference in the data base, shares the structure of legal
reasoning."); M.B.E. Smith, Should Lawyers Listen to Philosophers About Legal Ethics?, 9
LAW & PHIL. 67 (1990) (denying the assumption that practicing lawyers ought to defer to
philosophical claims about moral principle).
39. See, e.g., GADAMER, REASON, supra note 14, at 93; Hans-Georg Gadamer, Culture and
Media, in CULTURAL-POLITICAL INTERVENTIONS IN THE UNFINISHED PROJECT OF
ENLIGHTENMENT 171, 179-81 (Alex Honneth et al. eds., 1992) (criticizing the dismissal of
rhetoric as "ornate prattle" by scientific consciousness and recalling its central role in Greek
democracy and Roman republicanism).
40. For a detailed defense of the utility of the concept of rhetorical knowledge, see Mootz,
Rhetorical Knowledge, supra note 5, at 544-65. See generally BRUCE KRAJEWSKI, TRAVELING
WITH HERMES: HERMENEUTICS AND RHETORIC (1992); RHETORIC AND HERMENEUTICS IN
OUR TIME (Walter Jost & Michael J. Hyde eds., 1997).
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neither achieves apodictic certitude nor collapses into a relativistic
irrationalism; rhetorical knowledge therefore sustains legal practice
as a reasonable - even if not thoroughly rationalized - social activity.
It is perhaps misleading to characterize rhetorical knowledge as
the result of a "refashioning" to the extent that it calls to mind an
image of a skilled technician adjusting the rhetorical bonds of society
as one might adjust a carburetor to maximize engine performance.
The distinctiveness of rhetorical knowledge is that it emerges from
arguments grounded in probabilities and uncertainties and is not
produced by well-defined tools to secure pre-given ends. As an
expression of phronesis rather than techne, rhetorical knowledge is at
once a social accomplishment and an elaboration of the criteria for
assessing such accomplishments. Surveying accepted topics, norms,
and opinions as resources for confronting the demands of the case at
hand, rhetorical actors continually conjoin these constitutive features
of themselves and their society in unique ways that serve to recreate
the argumentative resources available for continued social discourse.
When the ongoing public debate over the legal status of assisted
suicide in America brings forth vigorous argumentation about the
meaning of the "inherent value of human life" and the "overriding
value of individual self-determination," it is clear that this debate will
reshape these familiar rhetorical commonplaces and therefore have a
substantial effect as these commonplaces are invoked in other
contexts. Individual self-conscious efforts to manipulate social
meanings (generally derided as "mere rhetoric") always are
predicated on wider, tacit rhetorical knowledge that is not subject to
individual manipulation as a whole because it is constitutive of one's
very sense of individuality.
My description of rhetorical engagement producing knowledge is
prone to the age-old critique that I can at most claim provisional
communal belief rather than true knowledge. Robert Scott defends
rhetorical knowledge against this charge in terms congenial to the
philosophical projects undertaken by Gadamer and Perelman. Scott
writes:
Seeing in a situation possibilities that are possibilities for us and
deciding to act upon some of these possibilities but not others
must be an important constituent of what we mean by human
knowledge. The plural pronoun in the foregoing sentence is
vital. As social beings, our possibilities and choices must often,
perhaps almost always, be joint.
The opacity of living is what bids forth rhetoric. A remark in
passing by Hans-Georg Gadamer seems to me to be an
important insight: the "concept of clarity belongs to the tradition
14
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of rhetoric." But few terms are more relative than that one nor
call forth more strongly a human element. Nothing is clear in
and of itself but in some context for some persons.
Rhetoric may be clarifying in these senses: understanding
that one's traditions are one's own, that is, are co-substantial
with one's own being and that these traditions are formative in
one's own living; understanding that these traditions are
malleable and that one with one's fellows may act decisively in
ways that continue, extend, or truncate the values inherent in
one's culture; and understanding that in acting decisively one
participates in fixing forces that will continue after the purposes
for which they have been immediately instrumental and will, to
some extent, bind others who will inherit the modified
traditions. Such understanding is genuinely knowing and is
knowing that becomes filled out in some particulars by
participating rhetorically.4
Rhetorical activity, thus conceived, is not a technical skill employed
in the pursuit of independently selected ends but rather is a means of
discerning and evaluating the ends available to a given community
with certain means at its disposal.
The reality of rhetorical knowledge is proved not because the
participants can employ a rhetorical methodology to uncover the
definitive "answer" to the question posed, but because they continue
to develop a public discussion along new lines of argumentation that
motivate action. Contrary to the understanding even of sophisticated
commentators, then, continuing debate is not a sign of rhetoric's
impotence, it is a manifestation of the living power of rhetorical
engagement. Argumentation does not leave everything as it was.
Even if a timeless answer to the debate cannot be found, the debate
continues on slightly different terms, responsive to ever-changing
contexts. Without rhetorical engagement, communication would be
nothing more than a directive issuing from a person who is insulated
from those whom she is addressing. In a word, communication would
be dead. The central question, then, is not whether rhetoric is a good
or bad basis for public life, but rather how to invigorate ongoing
rhetorical practices.
The legal system is one of the most important fora for the
development of rhetorical knowledge in contemporary American
society. This is true at all levels of legal discourse, but it is shown in
particularly sharp relief in the rights discourse of constitutional
41. Robert L. Scott, On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic: Ten Years Later, 27 CENT: STATES
SPEECH J. 258, 261 (1977).
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decisionmaking.12 In the recent "assisted suicide" case, Justice Souter
acknowledged the rhetorical depth of the Court's consideration of
this controversial issue, and he rejected the pretense of legal
decisionmaking as a dispassionate and orderly elaboration of pre-
established principles. 3 Although ostensibly repudiated by a bare
majority of the Court as a statement of governing principles,"
Souter's opinion persuasively describes the adjudication of
fundamental rights as a hermeneutical-rhetorical project in terms
that Gadamer and Perelman would endorse, even though Souter
articulates his reasoning in the idiom of contemporary constitutional
discourse.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Souter refused to follow the
artificial strictures of the Court's "substantive due process"
fundamental rights analysis, which he characterized as a process of
identifying "extratextual absolutes."'45 Instead, he argued that Justice
Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman" accurately characterized the long
tradition of due process jurisprudence as a form of common law
decisionmaking:
Although the Poe dissent disclaims the possibility of any
general formula for due process analysis... Justice Harlan of
course assumed that adjudication under the Due Process
Clauses is like any other instance of judgment dependent on
common-law method, being more or less persuasive according to
the usual canons of critical discourse.... When identifying and
assessing the competing interests of liberty and authority, for
example, the breadth of expression that a litigant or a judge
selects in stating the competing principles will have much to do
with the outcome and may be dispositive ....
Just as results in substantive due process cases are tied to
the selections of statements of the competing interests, the
42. It is a well-worn (but no less true) insight that legal philosophy fails to address the full
scope of its object of study because it focuses almost exclusively on decision-making by
appellate courts. I have argued that a hermeneutical-rhetorical account is equally illuminating
with respect to the far more pervasive and important practice of lawyer-client deliberations.
See Mootz, Rhetorical Knowledge, supra note 5, at 569-70. Nevertheless, appellate decisions
provide good vehicles for crystallizing the hermeneutical reality that subtends not only all of
legal practice, but all of life. Borrowing Gadamer's terms, appellate decisionmaking has
exemplary significance for legal hermeneutics.
43. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258,2274 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
44. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2268. Five Justices joined the Opinion of the Court, but
five Justices writing separately (including Justice O'Connor, who joined in the majority
opinion) embraced in varying degrees the kind of reasoning that Souter describes. Only Justice
Breyer expressly referred to Souter's analysis in favorable terms, see id. at 2311 (Breyer, J.,
concurring), but he did not join Justice Souter's opinion.
45. Id. at 2281 (Souter, J., concurring).
46. 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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acceptability of the results is a function of the good reasons for
the selections made. It is here that the value of common-law
method becomes apparent, for the usual thinking of the
common law is suspicious of the all-or-nothing analysis that
tends to produce legal petrification instead of an evolving
boundary between the domains of old principles. Common-law
method tends to pay respect instead to detail, seeking to
understand old principles afresh by new examples and new
counterexamples. The "tradition is a living thing," albeit one
that moves by moderate steps carefully taken."
Souter tracks the philosophical claims made by Gadamer and
Perelman about the nature of human understanding and the
acquisition of knowledge, lending support to their claim that the
demands of legal practice may indeed highlight the hermeneutical-
rhetorical features of all understanding. Lawyers know very well that
argumentation is a bounded and rational enterprise that nevertheless
cannot aspire to a process of deduction from principles, even though
the rhetorical conventions of legal practice and judicial opinion-
writing ironically work to conceal this (supposedly dangerous) fact:
"[T]he particular rhetoric that law embraces is the rhetoric of
foundations and logical deductions [and] is one that relies, above all
else, upon the denial that it is rhetoric that is being done.""s Because
legal practice succeeds as a reasonable activity, and because the
hermeneutical-rhetorical nature of this practice is apparent despite
the scientistic terminology of legal positivism, there are strong
grounds for accepting the philosophical thesis that rhetorical
knowledge is a form of human understanding that is exemplified in
legal practice.
D. Rhetorical Hermeneutics and Natural Law Philosophy
Although Gadamer fully embraces the antifoundationalist
movement to radically situate all understanding in the
hermeneutical-rhetorical experience of finite, historical beings, he
makes a somewhat surprising turn at a crucial juncture of his
magnum opus when he endorses Aristotle's classical account of
47. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2284 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 544
(Harlan, J., dissenting)). Justice Souter ultimately concurred with the Court that terminally ill
patients competent to express their wishes do not have a constitutional right to physician-
assisted suicide, but he did so because he believed that the state legislatures were making
reasonable, if debatable, decisions that the strong interest in protecting terminally ill patients
from involuntary suicide and euthanasia could be effected only by a complete ban on assisted
suicide. See id. at 2290-93.
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natural law. Gadamer emphasizes that Aristotle's characterization of
natural law as a changeable feature of human existence coincides
with his hermeneutical philosophy and differs substantially from
traditional, post-Thomistic natural law accounts:
For Aristotle, [the fact that natural law is not timeless and
unchanging] is wholly compatible with the fact that it is
"natural" law.... [Unlike, for example, traffic regulations, there
are] things that do not admit of regulation by mere human
convention because the "nature of the thing" constantly asserts
itself. Thus it is quite legitimate to call such things "natural law."
In that the nature of the thing still allows some room for play,
natural law is still changeable.... [Aristotle] quite clearly
explains that the best state "is everywhere one and the same,"
but it is the same in a different way than "fire burns everywhere
in the same way, whether in Greece or in Persia."
... [Aristotle's natural laws] are not norms to be found in
the stars, nor do they have an unchanging place in a natural
moral universe, so that all that would be necessary would be to
perceive them. Nor are they mere conventions, but really do
correspond to the nature of the thing-except that the latter is
always itself determined in each case [contextually]."
At first, the claim that "the nature of the thing still allows some room
for play" appears to be a wholesale surrender of natural law
principles to the interpretive turn, but Gadamer proves to be quite
serious in his desire to recover the wisdom of classical natural law
thinking.
Gadamer directly ties the classical conception of natural law to his
critique of legal positivism. Commenting on the intellectual scene in
Germany, Gadamer concludes that legal positivism "probably has no
supporters today" because the "distance between the law and the
individual case seems to be absolutely indissoluble."' To drive this
point home, he returns to the classical conception of natural law in
an extended discussion of the nature of legal regulation. Gadamer
begins by emphasizing the necessity of free play in legal
interpretation:
It is no mere unavoidable imperfection in the process of legal
codification when it leaves free play for its application to
concrete instances, as if this free play could, in principle, be
reduced at will. To be "elastic" enough to leave this kind of free
49. GADAMER, supra note 6, at 319-20.
50. Id. at 518.
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play seems rather to be in the nature of legal regulation as such,
indeed of legal order generally."
He then draws the important, and surprising, link between
Aristotle's conception of natural law and free play:
If I am not mistaken, Aristotle was quite clear about this when
he ascribed an exclusively critical function to the idea of natural
law rather than a positive, dogmatic one. It has always been felt
to be shocking (when it was not denied outright, by
misinterpreting Aristotle's text) that he distinguishes between
conventional and natural law, yet goes on to claim that natural
law can be changed.
Natural law and law established by statute are not "equally
changeable." Rather, by considering comparable phenomena it
is explained that even what is just by nature is changeable,
without on that account ceasing to be different from that which
is established by mere statute. Obviously traffic regulations, for
example, are not changeable to the same but to a much higher
degree than something naturally just. Aristotle seeks not to
detract from this view but to explain how to distinguish what is
naturally just in the unstable human world (in contrast to that of
the gods). Thus he says that the distinction between what is
naturally right and what is legal or conventional is evident-
despite the changeability of both-as the distinction between
the right hand and the left. There too by nature the right is the
stronger, and yet this natural priority cannot be described as
unchangeable, since, within limits, it can be removed by training
the other hand. 2
Gadamer then brings home the paradoxical point that natural law
exists only by virtue of the bounded flexibility experienced in
interpretive applications:
"Within limits," that is, within a certain area of free play. To
leave this [free play in law], far from destroying the meaning of
right order, belongs rather to the essential nature of the
situation: "The law is universal and cannot therefore answer to
every single case." The disposition of the case does not result
from the codification of law but, on the contrary, the
codification of laws is possible only because laws are, in
themselves and by nature, universal. 3
51. Id. at 518-19.
52. Id. at 519.
53. Id. at 519-20 (quoting HELMUT KUHN, ZEITSCHRIFT FOR POLMK 289,299 n.4 (1956)).
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Aristotle's natural law philosophy thus serves as a critique of
positivism as well as a critique of the Stoic and the "medieval form of
natural law, to say nothing of that of the Enlightenment," 4 a point
made obvious by Gadamer's insistence that an indeterminate realm
of "free play" is not merely a tolerated feature but an essential
component of the natural law account.
Significantly, Gadamer extends the scope of his natural law
analysis beyond legal and political questions and applies it to all
moral knowledge. He rejects the idea that moral knowledge exists
independently of contextual efforts to live correctly, that moral
"ends" can be discovered and then pursued as predetermined goals
with appropriate "means."55 Gadamer emphasizes this point by
careful attention to Aristotle's terminology: Morality is never a
matter of techne-a learned skill such as carpentry that pursues
predetermined ends-but rather is a matter of praxis that exhibits
phronesis-a practical judgment rendered within a given situation
concerning the appropriate course of action. Thus morality
simultaneously is an "end" and a "means.
56
[W]e do not possess moral knowledge in such a way that we
already have it and then apply it to specific situations.... What
is right, for example, cannot be fully determined independently
of the situation that requires a right action from me, whereas the
eidos of what a craftsman wants to make is fully determined by
the use for which it is intended. 7
Notwithstanding the contextual and historical dimensions of the
natural law-both in terms of moral knowledge and legal
correctness-Gadamer insists that it is appropriate to regard it as
"natural law," inasmuch as he rejects the idea that the interpreter
can impose an interpretation or moral judgment as a manifestation
solely of her subjective will.
Scholars have paid insufficient attention to the mutually
reinforcing character of Gadamer's hermeneutics and Perelman's
new rhetoric, and they have completely missed the fact that these
two philosophers pursue similar avenues of inquiry into the natural
law tradition. Perelman also insists that natural law philosophy
contains important insights, even as he rejects the traditional claim
that justice is achieved when the "natural law"-regarded as a
universal and timeless set of directives-is instantiated through
positive law. Perelman echoes Gadamer in arguing that Aquinas and
54. Id. at 533.
55. Id. at 320-22.
56. Id. at 316-18.
57. Id. at 317.
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Aristotle both invoked a more subtle conception of natural law that
has been lost in the intervening centuries of commentary. Following
this tradition, Perelman insists that the natural law tradition can
embrace the ontological pluralism of legal argumentation without
degenerating into relativism:
The idea of natural law is also misconceived when it is posed in
ontological terms.... Natural law is better considered as a body
of general principles or loci, consisting of ideas such as "the
nature of things," "the rule of law," and of rules such as "No one
is expected to perform impossibilities," "Both sides should be
heard"-all of which are capable of being applied in different
ways. It is the task of the legislator or judge to decide which of
the not unreasonable solutions should become a rule of positive
law. Such a view, according to Michel Villey, corresponds to the
idea of natural law found in Aristotle and St. Thomas
Aquinas-what he calls the classical natural law."
Although legal practice can never be reduced to formal logic, there is
a nature of law in the sense that all legal argumentation works from
presumed agreement embodied in rhetorical commonplaces and
toward persuading others with reasonable arguments about the
proper course of action.
Both Gadamer and Perelman return to classical conceptions of
natural law in the course of outlining their anti-foundationalist
accounts of human understanding and communication. This curious
move might be explained in part by the fact that they wrote at a time
when natural law and legal positivism were the competing
orientations in legal theory, with the result that their anti-positivist
stance became a commitment to natural law by default. However, it
seems clear that Gadamer and Perelman look back to the classical
natural law tradition in order to demonstrate their opposition not
only to legal positivism, but also to the natural law philosophy
prevalent at the time.59 Yet again, Vico's return to classical rhetoric
in the face of the Cartesian conception of reason anticipates
58. PERELMAN, supra note 29, at 33-34. I read Perelman's criticism of an "ontological"
conception of natural law as a critique of the idea that moral rules for action are given and do
not present problems in application, and not as a critique of the ontological approaches by Lon
Fuller and Lloyd Weinreb that I discuss later.
59. Douglas Kries contends that Leo Strauss made a similar move against Thomistic
orthodoxy and back to the classical conception. See Douglas Kries, On Leo Strauss's
Understanding of the Natural Law Theory of Thomas Aquinas, 57 THOMIST 215, 216 (1993).
Gadamer lauds Strauss's recovery of classical natural law, see GADAMER, supra note 6, at 532,
although he does not embrace Strauss without substantial dissent, see id. at 540-41. For an
extended discussion of the points of dispute between Gadamer and Strauss, see CATHERINE H.
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Gadamer's philosophical insight. Vico rejected the efforts of Grotius
and Pufendorf to advance Thomistic natural law by grounding "law
in a nonhistorical reality," arguing instead that the natural conditions
under which human reason flourishes can be investigated as the link
between natural law and political action:
Donald P. Verene has summarized Vico's position as holding
that the universal law is established by custom and is a reflection
of the sensus communis. Universal law "emerges as the form of
society itself and is the basis from which law is subsequently
formed." The universal law emerges from the conditions of
primordial existence, which elicit similar responses from all
societies rather than from a formulation of some rational ideal.'
The idea of a historically contingent, yet deeply constitutive ground
of law and morality is precisely what Gadamer advances in his
hermeneutical philosophy.
Gadamer's reference to natural law in the course of his treatise on
hermeneutics appears strange and misguided, then, only because
"natural law" generally is presumed to require invariant moral
truths. An excerpt from Anthony D'Amato's recently published
jurisprudence text reflects the deeply ingrained bias that natural law
must invoke universal and eternal principles of morality if it is to
have any purchase at all:
If substantive natural law requires that the validity of law be
checked by its congruence with principles of morality, it follows
that these principles of morality must be fixed principles. If the
principles of morality were to change from time to time or from
place to place, then they could hardly serve as a reference point
for the validity of law. Or, to put this matter more succinctly,
substantive natural law rules out the notion of moral relativism.
The substantive natural law position holds that some things
are right for all times and all places, that other things are always
wrong no matter when and no matter where, and that two
reasonable people cannot honestly differ about what is right and
what is wrong because if they differed then one of them would
not be reasonable. 1
60. SCHAEFFER, supra note 8, at 82 (quoting DONALD P. VERENE, VICO'S SCIENCE OF
IMAGINATION 61 (1981)).
61. Anthony D'Amato, Universal Morality, in ANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE ANTHOLOGY
97,98 (Anthony D'Amato ed., 1996); see also RUSSELL HITNGER, A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW
NATURAL LAW THEORY (1987) (criticizing John Finnis, but supporting a strong version of
natural law); PAULINE C. WESTERMAN, THE DISINTEGRATION OF NATURAL LAW THEORY
292 (1997) (arguing that Finnis's reduction of natural law philosophy to a rationalistic
conception of the operation of practical reason has amounted to an abandonment of natural
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D'Amato's extreme formulation reveals the tacit assumptions of
most theorists: Natural law either provides indubitable answers or
we are consigned to moral relativism. D'Amato does not explain why
it must follow that changeable principles of morality cannot serve as
a reference point for the validity of law, but one can infer that he
equates "changeable" with "determined as a matter of subjective
will" from the fact that he equates "changeable" with "relativism."
This conflation is simply untenable, inasmuch as there is an
important distinction between believing that an individual simply
posits moral norms in accordance with her preferences and believing
that individuals are subject to moral norms that are beyond
individual subjective desire and yet still historically conditioned. In
both cases the relevant norms are changeable, yet it does not follow
that legal validity cannot rest on the norms that are changeable in
the latter sense. D'Amato plays off a conceptual confusion that
arranges the world either in terms of timeless and objective moral
rules or in terms of untrammeled individual choice.62 Gadamer's
philosophy is intended to disrupt precisely this misguided bifurcated
thinking that has undermined natural law thinking due to the
absence of absolute foundations.
Gadamer breaks with the absolutist tradition of natural law to
avoid the "gradual increase of insoluble problems"'63 natural law
philosophers have experienced in their search for a firm foundation
for moral decisionmaking once Aquinas's unconditional faith in God
became problematic. Gadamer's solution is to locate the reality of
moral action and deliberation in the rhetorical-hermeneutical
law, which "was designed to pass a verdict on contingent matters from a fixed and universal
point of view.... If a theory of natural law relegates the discussion of such topics to the realm
of the 'contingent,' it has lost any practical significance").
62. Arthur Leff's classic essay on the fundamental tensions of contemporary jurisprudence
artfully exposes the bipolar paradigm exemplified in traditional natural law philosophy as a
deep-seated desire to be wholly constrained in accordance with the strongest versions of
natural law and also to be wholly free and self-determining. "What we want, Heaven help us, is
simultaneously to be perfectly ruled and perfectly free, that is, at the same time to discover the
right and the good and to create it," Leff notes, but our lack of faith in natural law ordained by
God leaves us with only unconvincing pleas about objective morality and a deep, nagging
skepticism. Arthur Leff, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1229. Leff responds to this
situation in a somewhat curious manner: "All I can say is this: it looks as if we are all we
have.... Only if ethics were something unspeakable by us, could law be unnatural, and
therefore unchallengeable. As things now stand, everything is up for grabs." Id. at 1249. He
concedes that he has no knock-down argument against skeptical rejoinders to assertions of
moral truths, but he does link the "natural" law with "speakable ethics" that remain open to
challenge and deliberation. What Gadamer wishes to accomplish by returning to Aristotelian
natural law theory is to demonstrate that this understanding of natural law suffices to make
sense of our experience of normativity. Although Left appears confounded by the argument
that a historical conception of a changeable natural law yields only relativism, Gadamer wants
to make good on Leff's famous plea that we can state with justification that "napalming babies
is bad," even in the face of the inevitable "Sez who?" Id.
63. WESTERMAN, supra note 61, at 6.
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engagement of finite and historical beings. Natural law is rendered
"natural" once again by attending to the ontological features of
human nature instead of theorizing about the epistemological
powers of human reason.' Jeremy Waldron has argued with
justification that the existence of an objective moral order against
which human conduct could be judged is, in the end, irrelevant to the
practical concerns of a judge faced with a troubling case or a person
faced with a moral dilemma. "That there is a right answer 'out there'
(or wherever) certainly means that a judge is not making a fool of
herself when she goes out ponderously in search of it. But its
existence doesn't drive her to pursue it, let alone determine that she
will reach it."65 If natural law philosophy is construed as the
elucidation of timeless truths, Waldron's criticism is devastating.
However, Gadamer argues that the classical approach to natural law
is concerned with the reality of moral deliberation and the means by
which social actors address practical problems. In short, Gadamer
recuperates ontological inquiry into the human experience of
normativity primarily by rejecting natural law accounts of
independent moral truths in favor of the classical focus on the
experience of normativity.
The return to a focus on human "nature" is not without problems.
In her recent critique of the natural law tradition, Pauline
Westerman discounts the plausibility of an ontological approach
based on "nature," arguing that such an approach ultimately either
devolves into John Finnis's unsatisfactory rationalistic approach or
commits the naturalistic fallacy.' Because Gadamer's project
proceeds from an ontological account of human nature, it is
important to understand how he avoids the naturalistic fallacy.
Anthony Lisska's recent effort to recuperate the natural law
philosophy of Aquinas by emphasizing its Aristotelian character
provides substantial guidance in this task. Lisska begins by
emphasizing that eternal law for Aquinas is an "archetype" issuing
64. Jeffrey Stout argues that natural law philosophy collapsed when ethical realism gave
way to modem scientific consciousness, but he contends that the contemporary reevaluation of
epistemology in the natural sciences may permit natural law philosophy to advance by simply
recognizing that the realist/anti-realist debate in ethics is unproductive from the start. See
Jeffrey Stout, Truth, Natural Law, and Ethical Theory, in NATURAL LAW THEORY:
CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 71 (Robert P. George ed., 1992).
65. Jeremy Waldron, The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity, in NATURAL LAW THEORY,
supra note 64, at 158, 183.
66. See WESTERMAN, supra note 61, at 288-89. G.E. Moore famously argued that moral
language cannot be reduced to language that describes natural facts, and so moral discourse
must be regarded as sui generis. See G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 10 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 1980) (1903). The "fallacy" occurs when philosophers attempt to derive moral
prescriptions from natural facts.
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from God rather than a rulebook directed to man.67 In contrast,
"natural law" can be discovered independently of theology by
analyzing the dispositional properties that define human nature.
Closely tracking Aristotle's discussion of the ends attendant to
human nature, Aquinas demonstrates how a naturalistic ethics can
avoid the naturalistic fallacy. "There is no radical bifurcation
between fact and value because the value-i.e. the 'good'-is
nothing more than the development of the process structured by the
nature of the set of dispositions. '69 Nevertheless, these dispositions
do not translate directly to detailed ends that definitively specify
appropriate moral conduct in concrete situations. Lisska emphasizes
that Aquinas viewed Aristotelian practical reasoning (prudentia) as
necessary for determining correct actions in light of the dispositional
properties of human nature and the exigencies of the particular
situation."
Lisska rejects Finnis's natural law philosophy for reinscribing an
excessive rationalism as a solution to the naturalistic fallacy. Finnis
67. ANTHONY J. LissKA, AQUINAS'S THEORY OF NATURAL LAW: AN ANALYTIC
RECONSTRUCTION 95 (1996).
68. Lisska argues:
On this scheme of meta-ethical naturalism, it follows that an immoral action is the
hindering of the natural developmental process based upon the dispositional properties
common to human beings. Morality has its foundation in human nature.... An act is
wrong, not on account of God's command, but because the act hinders the development
of the human dispositions.
Id. at 104. This is not to underemphasize the importance of God in Aquinas's approach, but
only to note that the existence of God is of only marginal relevance in working out his
naturalistic ethics. "That God may have created the structure of human nature differently is
not the issue. Of course that could have taken place. But once human nature had been
established, certain moral rules follow from the divine archetype of human nature." Id. at 115;
see also id. at 116-38 (distinguishing the question of God's existence and corresponding eternal
law from the fact of human existence and corresponding natural law in Aquinas's thought).
69. Id. at 199.
70. Lisska writes:
In rendering moral decisions, natural law moral theory always admits the radical
contingency of the particular situation.
There is a radical particularity in Aristotle and Aquinas involving moral situations that
is opposed theoretically to the rule-bound directives of most post-Enlightenment moral
theory. This is especially true of most rule deontological normative systems. Considering
the particular action to be undertaken in a specific situation-what Aquinas often refers
to as a "contingent situation"-both Aristotle and Aquinas sound like existentialists
lamenting against the strict constructionalism of rule-based theory. This radical
contingency of Aristotelian and Aquinian moral theory should not be forgotten in the
process of developing a consistent theory of natural law.
Id. at 253.
The action, however, is always in the context of developing the dispositional properties
which make up the human essence. Hence, while similar to the subjectivity of the
existentialists, none the less the content of human nature-the set of dispositional
properties-determines the general boundaries of the actions to be undertaken.
Id. at 216-17.
25
Mootz: Law in Flux
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1999
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 11: 311
separates the activity of developing moral judgment with practical
reasoning from an ontological account of human nature, thereby
importing theoretical reasoning into his approach under the guise of
practical reasoning.7' Lisska demonstrates that Aquinas develops a
more satisfactory approach by returning to human nature as a guide
for the exercise of a thoroughly contextual practical reasoning.
Lisska's reading of Aquinas need not rest on essentialist assumptions
about human nature in order to provide a persuasive rebuttal to the
charge by critics that Gadamer falls victim to the naturalistic fallacy.
Gadamer's ontology of human understanding represents a similar
focus on the ontology of human experience, but it is guided by the
contemporary recognition that dispositional properties are
communally reinscribed in and emerge from a historical pattern of
linguistically-mediated lived practices. By reconceiving dispositional
properties as culturally and historically contingent, yet determinative
of human agency in much deeper ways than mere habit, Gadamer
articulates a natural law philosophy that at once avoids the
naturalistic fallacy and does not run afoul of contemporary post-
metaphysical philosophy.
Gadamer's recourse to deep social traditions avoids the absolutism
of traditional natural law philosophy without committing the
naturalistic fallacy, but he courts a different set of difficulties. Joseph
Boyle, a prominent natural law philosopher aligned with Finnis, has
delivered a sophisticated challenge to natural law accounts that are
grounded only in the social practices and lived ethical experiences of
a community. Boyle's arguments prove to be helpful in sharpening
Gadamer's conception of the classical natural law tradition, which is
rooted in communal life. Boyle readily agrees that natural law
discourse is tradition-dependent in the sense that it can occur only
within the language and set of questions of a particular community,
and that it is part of a developing intellectual tradition, but he denies
that ethical inquiry can be rooted only in a shared way of life.73
Arguing that there is no basis for moral criticism available to a
person living within a thoroughly evil community such as Nazi
Germany unless universal principles of practical reason are
acknowledged, Boyle defends the traditional assumption that the
natural law must be constitutive of all persons in an acontextual way
against the communitarian philosophy of contextualized "virtues
71. See id. at 156.
72. See Joseph Boyle, Natural Law and the Ethics of Traditions, in NATURAL LAW
THEORY, supra note 64, at 3.
73. See id. at 4-9.
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Whatever the merits of Boyle's argument against modern
communitarians, it carries no weight when applied to Gadamer's
hermeneutical account. Gadamer does not return to classical natural
law in order to substitute a univocal "common way of life" for the
problematic assertions of a unitary capacity of practical reason to
underwrite moral discourse. Quite the contrary, Gadamer contends
that the ongoing contest of values in a divided, heterogeneous
society indicates the existence of deeply constitutive commonplaces
that permit such debate in the first place, and that it is through such
debate that the "nature of the thing" can reveal itself. Gadamer lived
under the terror of Nazi Germany as a philosophy professor, after
all, and it is perfectly plausible that it was the lived resources of
German life and intellectual history that he elaborated in his
decision not to become complicit in the Nazi regime. The "nature of
the thing" in moral deliberation is not equivalent to a widely adopted
pattern of behavior (which may at times in the life of a community
be regarded as profoundly immoral), but rather is the product of a
deep, yet conflicted, tradition that can be invoked in criticism even of
widespread, officially sanctioned practices. Far from being a crude
conventionalist, Gadamer embraces classical natural law philosophy
in part to explain why human understanding "certainly does not
mean merely appropriating customary opinions or acknowledging
what tradition has sanctified." '75
Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, as supplemented by
Perelman's new rhetoric, provides a challenging account of human
understanding and reason that holds special importance for legal
theorists. At the same time, legal practice is a particularly instructive
venue for rhetorical knowledge, and so legal theorists are well-
positioned to provide important contextual development of these
themes. The classical natural law tradition that Gadamer employs-
as opposed to traditional, post-Thomistic accounts- provides a rich
point of reference for bringing legal theorists into conversation with
the "interpretive turn" in philosophy. In the next section, I
demonstrate that Gadamer's approach provides an opening to two
legal theorists who employ a decidedly non-traditional natural law
approach. Lon Fuller and Lloyd Weinreb are two of the most
prominent natural law philosophers in this century. Their substantial
contributions to legal theory come to light by acknowledging that
they proceed in a manner that echoes Gadamer's postmodern
philosophical claims.
74. Id. at 17-18.
75. GADAMER, supra note 6, at xxxvii.
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III. RECONSIDERING THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION
A. Procedural Natural Law and Social Dynamics: Lon Fuller
Today, natural law philosophy finds few advocates among legal
theorists working outside the Roman Catholic tradition.76 Ronald
Dworkin famously acknowledged that his claim that legal
decisionmaking involves recourse to substantive principles of
morality probably falls within the natural law tradition, broadly
defined, but he has not emphasized this reading of his legal
philosophy.77 Perhaps the most famous contemporary natural law
thinker is Lon Fuller, who developed a procedural natural law-
which he termed an "internal morality of law" -as a sharply defined
alternative to the orthodoxy of legal positivists in the post-War years.
Fuller's natural law approach commonly is misinterpreted as either a
hollow echo of the natural law tradition78 or as an essentialist
conception of law at odds with the legal realist world that he helped
to create with his doctrinal scholarship,79 but his approach is best
understood as a serious effort to develop the classical natural law
tradition.
Fuller was unabashedly a natural law philosopher. When asked
whether his theory was a variant of natural law philosophy, he
responded with "an emphatic, though qualified, yes."'  His natural
law approach is most generally summarized as the belief "that there
is a possibility of discovery in human relations as in natural
76. In making this statement, I intend to distinguish natural law from natural rights
jurisprudence, as the latter is plainly a fixture in American legal theory. See Randy E. Barnett,
A Law Professor's Guide to Natural Law and Natural Rights, 20 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 655
(1997). The eclipse of natural law by positivism is the crucial distinguishing demarcation
between pre-Civil War jurisprudence in America and the modem jurisprudence of the
postbellum years, although Stephen Feldman contends that both traditions were
foundationalist in their own ways. See Stephen Feldman, From Premodern to Modern
American Jurisprudence: The Onset of Positivism, 50 VAND. L. REv. 1387 (1997). For a
comprehensive bibliography of contemporary natural law scholarship, see James V. Schall, The
Natural Law Bibliography, 40 AM. J. JURIS. 157 (1995).
77. See Ronald M. Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 165, 165 (1982).
78. See, e.g., Robert Henle, Principles of Legality: Qualities of Law, Lon Fuller, St. Thomas
Aquinas, St. Isidore of Seville, 1994 AM. J. JURIS. 47; William S. Miller, Jr., Book Review, 1985
AM. J. JURIS. 225, 227 (reviewing ROBERT SUMMERS, LON FULLER (1984) & LON L. FULLER,
THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER: SELECTED ESSAYS OF LON L. FULLER (Kenneth
Winston ed., 1981)) (criticizing Fuller's efforts to "deodorize" natural law).
79. See, e.g., James Boyle, Legal Realism and the Social Contract: Fuller's Public
Jurisprudence of Form, Private Jurisprudence of Substance, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 371, 373
(1993) ("Fuller, the early contracts theorist, apparently undermines the claims made by Fuller,
the later jurisprude").
80. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 96 (1969); see also LISSKA, supra note 67, at
21 (characterizing Fuller as "the principal exponent of natural law among legal scholars in the
United States at mid-century"); ROBERT S. SUMMERS, LON L. FULLER 62 (1984) ("Fuller
readily identified himself with that tradition").
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science.""1 He rejected the prevailing view of his day that values are
not subject to reasoned elaboration, and he insisted that escape from
the narrow confines of legal positivism required "some measure of
sympathy for the essential aims of the school of natural law."'
In a private note about natural law [Fuller] asks: "Is there an
objective basis for legal rules; ultimately this means[: Is there an
objective basis] for ethical judgments[?] ... I say there is an
objective basis in this sense: There is a chance for discovery, a
pattern of order that will reconcile conflicting demands."8 3
Fuller's adherence to natural law philosophy certainly evolved, and it
was expressed differently to various audiences in a variety of venues,
but it remained consistent during his scholarly career."
Despite his expressed commitment to natural law philosophy,
Fuller also was a harbinger of the current intellectual scene in which
traditional natural law thinking no longer proves acceptable. Fuller
repeatedly made clear that he did not embrace the traditional
natural law approach of identifying the substantive goods of human
existence according to a transcendent standard,"5 and he coined the
term "eunomics" primarily to dissociate himself from absolutist
tendencies in the natural law tradition.' As he later explained with
reference to his early book, The Law in Quest of Itself, he advocated
81. LON L. FULLER, Letter from Lon L. Fuller to Thomas Reed Powell, in THE
PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER 294, 303 (Kenneth I. Winston ed., 1981) (n.d.); see also Lon L.
Fuller, The Philosophy of Codes of Ethics, 74 ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING 916 (1955).
To escape from the sterile absolutes that are now generally offered to us we must return
to a realization that there are natural laws of social order-laws that are "natural" in the
sense that they are given, laws that we do not know instinctively but must use our minds
and our powers of observation to discern and understand.
Id. at 916.
82. Lon L. Fuller, Human Purpose and Natural Law, 53 J. PHIL. 697, 705 (1956).
83. Kenneth I. Winston, Is/Ought Redux: The Pragmatist Context of Lon Fuller's
Conception of Law, 8 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 329, 347 (1988).
84. See LON L. FULLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER 276 (Kenneth I. Winston ed.,
1981) ("the intervening years, if anything, have strengthened this conviction" that the general
abandonment of the natural law approach by positivist theorists was a mistake requiring
correction); see also SUMMERS, supra note 80, at 151 (characterizing Fuller as "unquestionably
the leading secular natural lawyer of the twentieth century in the English-speaking world").
Lon Fuller's role in the creation of contemporary legal philosophy is too easily devalued by
adopting a caricature: Objecting to the divorce of law and morals in legal positivism, Fuller
retreated to a watered-down, perhaps even incoherent, version of natural law in an effort to
sustain the legitimacy and aim of legal practice. In this unflattering light, the famous debate
between Fuller and H.L.A. Hart becomes the whole story, with Fuller cast as a necessary,
albeit unpersuasive, intellectual foil for the triumph of legal positivism. Such an impoverished
reading lacks substantial textual support. Fuller articulated a sophisticated conception of
natural law that anticipated recent jurisprudential developments, and so it is a profound
mistake to picture him as desperately embracing a tired intellectual tradition.
85. See SUMMERS, supra note 80, at 64.
86. Lon L. Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 457,
477-80 (1954).
29
Mootz: Law in Flux
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1999
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 11: 311
"not a system of natural law but the natural-law method."' Fuller
argued that reasoned discovery was possible in the moral realm, but
he was equally adamant that traditionalist thinkers were wrong to
believe that reason could elaborate the full detail of moral
obligations." Fuller's natural law method, then, amounted to steering
a course between the extreme skepticism of positivist cultural
relativism and the imperious dictates of moral absolutism
traditionally associated with natural law. 9 This "emphatic, though
qualified" adoption of natural law is best captured in his assessment
of the shifting intellectual tide in the late 1960s:
In the reorientation that seems to be taking place, one hopes
that there will develop a little more tolerance for, and interest
in, the great tradition embodied in the literature of natural law.
One will find in this literature much foolishness and much that is
unacceptable to modem intellectual tastes; one will also find in
it practical wisdom applied to problems that may broadly be
called those of social architecture. 90
Fuller's relevance for contemporary jurisprudence principally lies in
his attempt to articulate a scholarly program for investigating the
natural laws of social dynamics without relapsing to the comforting
but misguided quest to develop a comprehensive natural law system
of substantive moral principles.
Some commentators have equated Fuller's conception of natural
law with his famously argued claim that eight procedural desiderata
must be met before legislation can be considered legal.9' If natural
law is nothing more than proper procedure, they conclude, Fuller
merely offers a morally neutral description of the effective means for
exercising governmental authority rather than elucidating moral
principles that constitute the nature of law.' Unfortunately, one of
Fuller's famous analogies lies at the root of this misreading,
87. FULLER, supra note 81, at 294, 296; see also LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF
ITSELF 103-04 (1940).
88. For example, Fuller distinguished between an appeal to nature in asserting that laws
should be clearly expressed and an appeal to nature to address the merits of specific moral
questions such as contraception or the legitimacy of governmental taxation. See FULLER, supra
note 80, at 101, 153.
89. See Fuller, supra note 81, at 916.
90. FULLER, supra note 80, at 241.
91. These well-known desiderata can be summarized briefly as requiring that laws be:
general rules, promulgated, prospective, clearly stated, consistent, able to be followed, stable,
and enforced. See id. at 39.
92. See Ronald Dworkin, Philosophy, Morality, and Law- Observations Prompted by
Professor Fuller's Novel Claim, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 668, 675 (1965); Martin P. Golding, Book
Review, 76 ETHics 225, 227 (1966); H.L.A. Hart, Book Review, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1281,
1284-85 (1965).
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uncharacteristically serving to obfuscate his analysis and misdirect
readers. At an important juncture of The Morality of Law, Fuller
compares lawmaking and carpentry as activities both having
"internal rules" of production that are divorced from the substantive
moral value of the finished product.93 A lawmaker can observe the
internal morality of law in passing a substantively unjust law, he
suggests, just as a carpenter can observe the inner morality of
carpentry in constructing a hideout for thieves. This vivid
comparison misleads readers into concluding that Fuller is adopting
a wholly instrumental conception of the internal morality of law.'
Responding to the distinction between law's "inner morality" and
substantive "external morality" that Fuller emphasizes with the
carpentry metaphor, critics chided him by asking whether there also
is an "internal morality" of golf, blackmail, poisoning, or even
genocide.95
A review of Fuller's writings makes clear that his natural law
approach cannot fairly be read solely as an account of efficacious
governmental action. Fuller stressed that his distinction between the
"internal morality of law" and "external morality" was conceptual
rather than ontological, and that the dividing line between the
morality of duty and the morality of aspiration is a matter of ongoing
practical judgment.' Additionally, even if a sharp demarcation
between procedural means and substantive ends can be established
in defining the two moralities, Fuller consistently emphasized that
the two moralities coincide as a practical matter.' Positivists contend
93. FULLER, supra note 80, at 155-56.
94. See, e.g., SUMMERS, supra note 80, at 35-39. The carpentry metaphor is not an isolated
reference in Fuller's work, but instead is an example of Fuller's repeated invocation of images
of skilled artisans to explain his understanding of the knowledge about social structures that
can be derived and implemented by means of a natural law inquiry. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER,
The Lawyer as an Architect of Social Structures, in THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER, supra
note 84, at 264 (architect); Fuller, supra note 86, at 473 (gardener); Lon L. Fuller, Reason and
Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARv. L. REV. 376,379 (1946) (pastry chef).
95. See Dworkin, supra note 92, at 676 (blackmail and genocide); Golding, supra note 92,
at 227 (golf); Hart, supra note 92, at 1286 (poisoning).
96. FULLER, supra note 80, at 131-32, 239.
97. When challenged with the example of the apartheid regime of South Africa, which
appeared to be a legally effective government pursuing evil ends, Fuller insisted that the inner
morality of law was regularly violated by the South African government and that the
substantive immorality of apartheid was, as a practical matter, linked to the breakdown in the
principles of legality experienced in that society. See id. at 160. In a stiff pragmatist rebuke to
Hart for insisting that the coincidence of the two moralities did not overcome Hart's
conceptual citique, Fuller challenged the otherworldly emphasis of his critics:
Does Hart mean to assert that history does in fact afford significant examples of regimes
that have combined a faithful adherence to the internal morality of law with a brutal
indifference to justice and human welfare? If so, one would have been grateful for
examples about which some meaningful discussion might turn.
FULLER, supra note 80, at 154.
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that law and morals constitute separate spheres, but Fuller argues
that the weight of historical experience puts the burden on them to
demonstrate the usefulness of sharply separating the inner morality
of lawmaking from substantive principles of morality. Fuller's
position appears unconvincing on its face, inasmuch as he appears to
justify the inner morality of law on the basis of a causal connection
with substantive public morality,98 but it is important to remember
that Fuller regards the two moralities as connected by more than
mere coincidence in history. He insists that there exists a natural
affinity, or continuity of moral status, between the two moralities
despite the conceptual usefulness of distinguishing them. Fuller
argues that to be in a position to pursue morally praiseworthy goals,
citizens require a stable, institutionalized social framework within
which to act. Consequently, providing such a framework for moral
behavior-which is precisely the work of legislators, judges and
lawyers-is itself a moral undertaking. 9 The inner morality of law is
not just a means of distinguishing law from non-law, it also
represents the institutional form of law that enables citizens to
participate in the external morality of aspiration and excellence.
Fuller adopts a conceptual distinction between the two moralities,
then, only to explain better their nuanced connections.
The dynamic relationship between institutional forms and moral
principles is presented as an ontological claim, by which I take Fuller
to mean that the interpenetration of ends and means reflects part of
man's nature as a social animal."° Commentators now emphasize a
point repeatedly made by Fuller but overlooked by his critics: Law is
not a managerial exercise of authority directing another's behavior;
it is a cooperative effort that is founded on a tacit reciprocity
between lawmaker and citizen.' In response to his critics, Fuller
described law as a relational rather than as an anonymous institution,
and declared that it is this reciprocal relationship that inspires and
demands the citizen's fidelity to law. Morality is possible at all only
98. This is the basis for Fred Schauer's erroneous claim that Fuller can be read within the
positivist tradition as being concerned not with the ontology of law but simply with the most
efficient instrumental means for achieving a moral society. See Frederick Schauer, Fuller on the
Ontological Status of Law, in REDISCOVERING FULLER (Willem Witteveen & Wibren van der
Berg eds., forthcoming 1999).
99. See FULLER, supra note 80, at 205-06; see also SUMMERS, supra note 80, at 30.
100. Fuller's longstanding argument against the positivist dogma of the inviolable
separation of is and ought, of means and ends, girds his assertion that the inner morality of law
has moral standing by claiming an ontological continuity of institutional means and substantive
ends. See FULLER, supra note 84, at 47-64; see also Fuller, supra note 82, at 700 (arguing that
understanding is rooted in "our shared human nature, a nature that in both of us is at all times
incomplete and in process of development").
101. See FULLER, supra note 80, at 139, 192-93, 210, 219; Jeremy Waldron, Why Law-
Efficacy, Freedom, or Fidelity?, 13 LAW & PHIL. 259 (1994).
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within certain social settings, and the morality of law inheres
precisely in its valuable contributions to shaping these settings,
giving rise to correlative moral obligations of legislators, judges, and
lawyers to maximize this state of affairs.1"
With this degree of complexity and nuance in his account, it is
clear that Fuller cannot hope to maintain strict neutrality toward
ends that extend beyond the procedural principles of legality. In his
final reply to the persistent criticisms of The Morality of Law, Fuller
unambiguously concedes that there is a substantive core to his
natural law philosophy, although this admission often is lost amidst
his overwhelming focus on the inner morality of law and the
principles of eunomics. Fuller argues that the inner morality of law
reflects two substantive commitments that simultaneously are
constitutive of and predicated on law. First, the inner morality of law
is committed to an underlying view "that man is, or can become, a
responsible agent, capable of understanding and following rules, and
answerable for his defaults."' 3 This substantive commitment
embodies nothing more than an affirmation of the reality of
morality, which of course lies at the root of Fuller's rejection of the
behavioral-modification/coercion theory of law and his adoption of a
model of tacit reciprocity in lawmaking. More interesting is Fuller's
claim that the inner morality of law is premised on man's nature as a
communicative being.' In contrast to Hart's concession that a core
natural law principle might be located in man's struggle to survive
conditions of scarcity and violence, Fuller argues that the moral
commitments generated in communicative exchange extend beyond,
and sometimes override, the biologically-driven struggle to survive:"5
Communication is something more than a means of staying
alive. It is a way of being alive.... In the words of Wittgenstein,
"The limits of my language are the limits of my world."
If I were asked, then, to discern one central indisputable
principle of what may be called substantive natural law-
Natural Law with capital letters-I would find it in the
injunction: Open up, maintain, and preserve the integrity of the
channels of communication by which men convey to one
another what they perceive, feel, and desire. In this matter the
morality of aspiration offers more than good counsel and the
102. One of Fuller's many helpful metaphors makes this point clearly. A tree has natural
growing habits, but by carefully studying this nature a gardener can prune the tree to better
reveal this nature, even as the pruning serves to alter the nature to some degree. See Fuller,
supra note 86, at 473.
103. FULLER, supra note 80, at 162.
104. See id. at 184-85.
105. See id. at 184.
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challenge of excellence. It here speaks with the imperious voice
we are accustomed to hear from the morality of duty. And if
men will listen, that voice, unlike that of the morality of duty,
can be heard across the boundaries and through the barriers that
now separate men from one another."°
This invocation of communication resonates with Fuller's earlier
comparison of the common law system with a "discussion of two
friends sharing a problem together,""lc 7 and best explains his sustained
argument that law is deeply connected with the practices and
conventions of the community in which it is situated.1" With the
principle of open communication as a normative underpinning, it is
best to view Fuller's "tacit cooperation" thesis not as a formal
condition that must exist at the creation of a law, but rather as a
practical condition of social life that is essential to the ongoing
practices of a good and workable legal system.
Recognizing his commitment to a substantive principle of open
communication illuminates Fuller's project of eunomics, the study of
good and workable principles of institutional design. Legal
institutions serve as conduits for purposive activity, Fuller argued,
and should be designed and utilized accordingly:
In attempting to define a branch of social study that might be
called eunomics, I stated that an acceptance of this subject as
worthy of pursuit implies no commitment to "ultimate ends." I
was careful not to say that eunomics is indifferent to ends. In
view of the interaction of means and ends any sharp distinction
between a science of means and an ethics of ends is impossible.
In leaving the problem of "ultimates" unresolved I meant
merely to acknowledge that after careful study of the interaction
of means and ends with respect to a particular problem, men
may still differ as to what ought to be done and that eunomics
cannot promise to resolve all such differences.l"
Fuller's natural law development of an "internal morality of law" is
premised on the unavoidable use of practical reasoning within
various institutional settings to develop substantive goals, rather than
on elucidating pre-given ends.
Fuller's natural law philosophy can be understood fully only by
106. Id. at 186.
107. Fuller, supra note 82, at 703.
108. See Gerald Postema, Implicit Law, 13 LAw & PHIL. 361, 377 (1994) (arguing that
Fuller links the "effective interaction and cooperation between citizens and lawmaking and
law-applying officials" to the congruence of law and implicit social practices).
109. Fuller, supra note 86, at 480.
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teasing out his largely implicit commitments to substantive principles
of justice that have for the most part been overlooked. Whereas
Fuller labored within the confines of a dying debate between
traditional natural law philosophy and analytical legal positivism,
contemporary theorists can draw on sophisticated accounts of the
connections between man's nature as a communicative social being
and the operation of legal institutions. Philosophical hermeneutics
and rhetorical theory in particular provide the conceptual resources
necessary to appreciate and extend Fuller's important insights.
Before drawing these connections, however, I turn to the different
approach to natural law philosophy adopted by Fuller's colleague at
the Harvard Law School, Lloyd Weinreb. Weinreb's important work
within the classical natural law tradition adds refinement to the
issues that Fuller raised in an almost intuitive manner.
B. Ontological Natural Law and Deep Nomos: Lloyd Weinreb
Lloyd Weinreb offers a natural law account of substantive
morality, directly addressing the issues that Fuller bracketed in the
course of developing his idea of an internal morality of institutional
design. Weinreb explicitly criticizes Fuller's focus on procedural
matters as wholly insufficient, echoing Fuller's staunchest critics in
their assessment that his internal morality of law is not a morality at
all.11 Openly confronting the failures of post-Thomistic natural law
theorizing, Weinreb sets for himself no less a task than rediscovering
the wisdom of classical natural law and appropriating it to the
problems and demands of contemporary society. Simply put,
Weinreb rejects the modern deontological conception of natural law
as the capacity of human reason to deliver moral prescriptions in
particular cases in favor of the classical ontological conception of
natural law as the affirmation of the objective reality of morality in
social life:
If natural law is thought to affirm the truth of specific, concrete
moral principles, which resolve actual moral dilemmas, then [my
approach] barely touches it.... Belief that natural law gives
expression to a kind of revealed moral code unfortunately
persists, both among a small and rather special group of
defenders of natural law (who are spectacularly unsuccessful in
convincing anyone else) and among a much larger group, for
110. See Weinreb, Moral Point, supra note 2, at 102-03, 195. In recent correspondence
Weinreb acknowledges Fuller's pathbreaking importance as a natural law thinker but suggests
that it was Fuller's misunderstanding of the ontological depth of his arguments that
necessitates an extension of Fuller's prescient insights. Letter from Lloyd L. Weinreb, Dane
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whom that view of natural law is sufficient reason not only to
reject it but to ignore it.
There is another view of natural law, more consistent with
its long historical development and more compatible with
current philosophic thought .... From its earliest appearances
in classical Greek culture, at the very centre of natural law was
an affirmation of the reality of our moral experience, not merely
as subjective feelings or belief but as objectively real, an aspect
of what there is.'
Weinreb strongly asserts that,
[I]t is no part of the case for natural law that it furnishes
conclusive answers to our concrete moral dilemmas. It never
was and it is not now. The endings of Sophocles's great
tragedies, in which the Greek source of natural law is most
visible, are not pronouncements of moral truths. They are an
affirmation of the truth of morality ....112
Weinreb embraces substantive natural law philosophy, then, but only
with a revised sense of the potential fruits of this labor: "Natural law
doesn't provide moral truths, it just rebuts skepticism and
existentialism . ,113
Weinreb anchors his argument in an intellectual history that
attributes the collapse of natural law philosophy to the movement
away from classical conceptions. Under Weinreb's account, natural
law originated as an effort by the ancient Greeks to explain the
paradox that humans have free will, and yet are part of a causal
universe. The Greek solution was kosmos, the notion that the
universe in all respects reflected "rational unity" and "good order."
This ontological belief is wholly naturalistic: All that should happen
does happen, and all that happens should happen."4 In response to
the multicultural challenges of the Sophists, Plato and Aristotle
developed very different accounts that nevertheless served the same
function in the newly destabilized social milieu-opposing crude
conventionalism with the assertion that moral principles can be
derived from the nature of reality itself."' The Greek ontological
tradition reached its strongest voice in Cicero's battle against
111. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Natural Law and Rights, in NATURAL LAW THEORY, supra note
64, at 278, 297-98.
112. Weinreb, Case, supra note 2, at 7.
113. Weinreb, Moral Point, supra note 2, at 208-09.
114. See LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 19 (1987). Weinreb argues
that "the idea of a normative natural order and all that it implies is one of the strongest and
deepest currents of Greek thought. It is the current that fed the idea of natural law." Id. at 42.
115. See id. at 29-34.
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conventionalism -a seemingly inevitable byproduct of Rome's far-
flung empire-building-by joining reason, nature, and God to defend
the idea that law is "of universal application, unchanging and
everlasting[, and] valid for all nations and all times."....
Weinreb credits Aquinas with transforming natural law by
bringing it into direct relation with practical questions of morality
and positive law. Aquinas sought to "reconcile divine providence
with human freedom," acknowledging that the moral order of
eternal law does not determine appropriate human conduct in the
particulars."7  Against received wisdom, Weinreb argues that
Aquinas was not proposing that natural law can serve as a guide for
behavior or as a fixed standard of morality, but instead was intent on
upholding "the divine origin and order of the universe without
eliminating or contradicting our experience of rational freedom and
without discarding the actual institutions of a human community....
In Pauline Westerman's terminology, Aquinas regarded eternal law
as God's "style" rather than a detailed list of rules, a "style" that
rational beings could recognize and freely adapt to their own
affairs."9 Aquinas regards natural law as a non-inferential grasp of
the divine style: Determinant moral rules do not follow logically
from this understanding, but are the (always potentially fallible)
result of conscientious reflection and prudential deliberation with
others about the practical implications of the principles of the divine
style. 2° Far from the dogmatic believer who used natural law to
justify religious prescriptions, Weinreb argues that Aquinas
remained firmly within the ontological tradition of natural law by
seeking to account for the reality of moral action by human agents
operating in a causal universe.
Weinreb argues that contemporary natural law theorizing has
abandoned its ontological roots in favor of deontological theories
about how we may specify rights and moral responsibilities through
the use of reason. John Finnis is the most prominent example of this
development, inasmuch as he reinterprets Aquinas as claiming that
basic human goods are self-evident to reason,' and that practical
116. Id. at 40-41 (quoting MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA 3.22.33).
117. Id. at 56.
118. Id. at 62; see also Weinreb, Moral Point, supra note 2, at 195, 201 (explicating
Aquinas's argument).
119. WESTERMAN, supra note 61, at 31.
120. See id. at 72-73.
121. Finnis uses "self-evident" in a very strong sense that probably is better expressed by
saying that certain human goods are presupposed in the very exercise of reason, for without
these basic goods there could be no intentionality. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND
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reason can work from these incommensurable goods to defensible
resolutions of moral dilemmas." Weinreb insists that Finnis's
"natural law without nature" amounts to an empty promise that the
power of reason can deliver moral prescriptions. Weinreb concludes
that the natural law tradition finally stalls with the recognition of the
indeterminacy of practical reasoning in a world rent with competing
claims of right:
[T]o suggest that all that is involved [in moral decisionmaking] is
being "simply reasonable" (rather than what will appear to
many people as an exercise in casuistry to support a conclusion
reached on other, undisclosed grounds) will convince only the
already committed. Unless the basic goods and methodological
requirements are kept at a suitable level of abstraction, from
which conflicting concrete propositions can be derived, they are
themselves not self-evident. They amount to wise but quite
general moral counsel which is neither absolute nor, applied
concretely, certain. To suppose that conclusions so grounded are
themselves certain or that anyone who believes otherwise is
simply mistaken, despite the disagreement of so many morally
serious people, betrays a staggering confidence in one's own
moral judgment and, at the deepest level, confusion about the
nature of moral reasoning itself."z
Natural law thinking ceases to be philosophy under these conditions,
Weinreb claims, and instead becomes a shallow rhetorical
affirmation "in which one asserts the truth of one's moral premises
on the basis of some authoritative source or simply because one is
certain."12'
Weinreb acknowledges that both the Greek belief in a unified
normative order in nature and Finnis's rationalistic attempt to secure
moral knowledge by reason alone are implausible accounts of our
122. See WEINREB, supra note 114, at 108-17.
123. Weinreb, Moral Point, supra note 2, at 199.
124. Id. at 200. Weinreb is properly criticized by Robert George for misreading Finnis as
claiming that specific moral decisions are self-evident, when it is only the basic human goods
that are self-evident. See Robert P. George, Recent Criticisms of Natural Law Theory, 55 U.
Cm. L. REv. 1371, 1387 (1988). Finnis makes clear, following Aquinas, that there inevitably
will be reasonable disagreements about numerous moral questions, especially in the context of
legal decisionmaking. See John Finnis, Natural Law and Legal Reasoning, in NATURAL LAW
THEORY, supra note 64, at 134, 151-52 (criticizing Dworkin's "one right answer" thesis); see
also WESTERMAN, supra note 61, at 246-47 (arguing that Finnis must accept arbitrary choices
between competing basic goods). However, Weinreb's more general argument is that Finnis
obviously presumes that practical reason will resolve many more moral issues than it can in
fact resolve. Weinreb's point is that to argue against someone by claiming that they are being
"unreasonable" in persisting in a belief (such as that abortion or homosexual relationships are
morally, wrong) does nothing more than posit one's own beliefs in a particularly clumsy
manner.
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experience of normativity. "One as much as the other can only be
assumed. [However, i]t does not follow that natural law is mistaken.
For, whether we explain it or not, the experience of freedom
remains."'" He responds not by attempting to provide a new
grounding for natural law philosophizing about moral and legal
truths, but by returning to the ontological conception that natural
law just is an expression of the human condition. Although
conceding that a reductionist account of complete causality is
logically possible, Weinreb argues that completely eliminating moral
agency from our picture of the world would amount to embracing a
fundamentally different conceptual paradigm that amounts to a
change in a structural fact of our existence.126 He views natural law
philosophy, then, as an elaboration of the conceptual paradigm and
pattern of social practices that order human experience and thinking
as normatively laden activities.
One critic has charged that Weinreb "presents a sophisticated
philosophical argument that, if valid, makes philosophy a largely
meaningless exercise."'27 Weinreb admits as much, if one equates
meaningful philosophy with divining answers from outside the
practice in question." However, Weinreb provides lengthy
justification for continued development of the natural law tradition
as an ontological inquiry that can inform our understanding of the
human condition and facilitate ongoing practices, even if it cannot
judge these practices from the heavens. In particular, Weinreb
argues that our continuing political discourse about the values of
liberty and equality-and the overarching discourse about the
requirements of justice -provides access to the ontological
experience of morality in modern life." Seemingly antithetical
claims about the scope of liberty and equality as necessary
components of a just society do not evidence the absence of a natural
law grounding for political and legal theory, Weinreb emphasizes,
but instead are indicative of the deep nomos of contemporary social
life that continues to attribute responsibility and desert.
Complete liberty is as impossible as complete equality, Weinreb
argues, since both cases would amount to a renunciation of human
freedom and our lived experience of responsibility and desert.
125. WEINREB, supra note 114, at 126.
126. See id. at 265; see also LLOYD L. WEINREB, OEDIPUS AT FENWAY PARK: WHAT
RIGHTS ARE AND WHY THERE ARE ANY 45 (1994).
127. George, supra note 124, at 1372.
128. See Weinreb, supra note 111, at 301 ("Natural law may not matter a great deal
'functionally'; it is not likely to affect how one's obligations are established, the weight one
gives them, or the consequences of meeting or failing to meet them").
129. See WEINREB, supra note 114, at 224.
1999]
39
Mootz: Law in Flux
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1999
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 11: 311
Justice can become a concrete feature of social life, then, only if the
"unlimited extension of liberty and equality as abstract normative
ideas" is contained.130 Weinreb stresses that the power of reason
cannot contain either as a principle-hence the long stalemate in
political philosophy culminating in the dead-end of the Rawls-
Nozick debate13'-since the normative force of these principles
emerges from lived social practices rather than as a matter of logical
deduction from indubitable first principles. Weinreb argues
forcefully that this social experience provides all the objective
foundation that is necessary to gird moral reflection and deliberation
when the social practices become problematic and engender debate:
It is important to emphasize that now as heretofore the case for
natural law must be cast in ontological terms; it must affirm the
actuality of morality, not merely as an attitude or belief,
however widely shared, but as something objectively real or
true. Such a case ... is made by grounding responsibility on the
deep conventions that constitute a human community[:] the
fixed, established ways of the community that [are] themselves a
ground of moral judgment [and that] are a matter of fact and
contestable, although they have normative significance."3
Weinreb disputes the possibility of a purely procedural or
transcendental conception of justice:
Without reference to the conventions of a community, in the
deep sense of the Greek nomos, the idea of justice has no
specific content. It expresses the abstract, antinomic
requirements of desert according to freedom and freedom
according to desert. If a community is on the whole stable and
there is a high degree of coherence between professed principles
of social order and actual practices, the shared, settled
understandings of its members may sustain a general sense of
what is just, which in turn supports the prevailing principles and
practices. People will then perceive the community as adhering
to an independent standard of justice, which does not merely
130. Id. at 230.
131. Weinreb writes:
The theories of Rawls and Nozick are as convincing as they are because each of them
elaborates one aspect of the complete idea of justice and excludes the other....
Nevertheless, the failure of each theory as a general theory of justice becomes evident
when they are placed side by side. Both play the same game; and one does not succeed
more than the other.
Id. at 240.
132. Weinreb, Case, supra note 2, at 10.
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describe its practices but validates them.133
This experience is not a form of false consciousness, a desperate
confusion of "is" and "ought," but rather an objective reality that
stands apart from subjective wishes:
Justice is conventional, as Protagoras said. It is variable from
one community to another and within the same community over
time, according to nomos. But it is not only that. It would be a
mistake to conclude that, after all, justice is nothing more than a
description of a community's strongly held beliefs. For the
experience of freedom is not open to question.... [T]he idea of
justice itself is both descriptive and normative. The separation
between what is and what ought to be fails us here, because the
notion of a person [as a moral agent] inescapably unites them.
The normative natural order is brought to its narrowest focus.
Perhaps it ought not surprise us that the kosmos lies within
ourselves.1 "
Deep practices and understandings bridge the is/ought distinction,
for they are facts subject to description yet they also exert normative
force sufficient to call particular practices into question. And so,
when Weinreb writes that, left "to our own devices, we have no
other guidance than the understandings and practices that inform the
experience of freedom itself, 135 he should not be misinterpreted as
offering a crude conventionalist account of morality, but rather a
natural law account of the objective nature of our historically-
contingent normative experience.
Informed by this ontological account, Weinreb believes that
philosophers should abandon the quest to provide a unifying
justification, or even a complete account, of normativity, which just is
a brute given of our experience."' Normativity does not represent a
conceptual problem to be resolved, Weinreb insists, but rather a
social experience to be fostered. Natural law philosophy has
benefited from the progressive realization that certain questions that
in the past were resolved by metaphysical assumptions about the
unity of nature or a benevolent God must simply remain unanswered
today. This acknowledgment, however, does not disable us from
133. WEINREB, supra note 114, at 248. Weinreb argues that this holds not just for relatively
stable societies, but for all societies to some degree. See id. at 232. In a subsequent essay,
Weinreb makes this same analysis in connection with the problem of rights generally. See
Weinreb, supra note 111, at 278.
134. WEINREB, supra note 114, at 249.
135. Id. at 241.
136. See id. at 263.
1999]
41
Mootz: Law in Flux
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1999
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 11: 311
getting along "as a practical matter, as our predecessors did also." '137
Today, political and legal resolutions of the competing values of
liberty and equality serve as one of the important sites where the
normativity of social practices and understandings is elaborated and
continued. The role of the natural law philosopher is to reveal this
dimension of our social experience and thereby to assist in this
unavoidably pragmatic enterprise.
C. Fuller, Weinreb, and the Interpretive Turn
Fuller and Weinreb both have developed sophisticated natural law
philosophies that claim only limited cash value with regard to
providing answers to specific questions, although both thinkers
supply theoretical backing for the effort to maximize rhetorical
knowledge within the ongoing practices of a given society. Fuller's
efforts to define a secular natural law theory are best read as
addressing precisely this question with respect to the design and
operation of legal institutions. Fuller's natural law philosophy is not
a curiosity hearkening back to a bygone intellectual era. It is an
innovative approach that anticipates contemporary hermeneutical
and rhetorical insights. Similarly, Weinreb's broader defense of
man's moral nature as a starting point for moral reflection and
deliberation accords with the ontological commitments that subtend
the contemporary "interpretive turn."
Fuller caps his natural law inquiry by acknowledging man's nature
as a communicative being, but this is only the starting point for
contemporary continental philosophers participating in the
"interpretive turn." Drawing from the complementary philosophical
projects undertaken by Gadamer and Perelman to locate the
reasonableness of legal practice in the social activity of producing
rhetorical knowledge, I construe Fuller's natural law philosophy as
an effort to articulate the principles of good social order that permit
and promote rhetorical knowledge, and Weinreb's natural law
philosophy as an effort to acknowledge the real constraining force of
a deep-seated, yet historically emergent, experience of morality.
Viewed through this contemporary lens, Fuller and Weinreb are
directly relevant to pressing questions in postmodern legal theory.
Interdisciplinary synergy is not a one-way street, of course, and so I
also argue that Fuller's eunomics and Weinreb's deep nomos lend
pragmatic strength to the concept of rhetorical knowledge by serving
as productive applications of contemporary hermeneutical and
rhetorical philosophy to questions of legal theory and practice. By
reintegrating the classical natural law tradition into contemporary
137. Id.
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discourse we can mitigate the forgetfulness that plagues all "new"
philosophical movements.
It should be apparent that philosophical hermeneutics and the
New Rhetoric share substantial common ground with Fuller's
eunomics, even if they employ the foreign vocabulary of
contemporary continental philosophy. 3' Fuller's carpentry metaphor
is ill-chosen precisely because it goes against the hermeneutical-
rhetorical orientation of his work. Designing institutional structures
and processes is not a technical project guided by a firm idea of a
desired social state, but instead is an inquiry into the broad
frameworks within which citizens may jointly define and create
desired social states. Legal actors are not like carpenters who pursue
defined ends by exercising a learned skill. They are more like a
person confronted with an ethical dilemma that demands a practical
judgment. In these situations a person's judgments both reflect her
moral sense and also define it. Fuller's eunomics is best reconceived
as an attempt to outline the social framework in which rhetorical
knowledge is possible.'39
Fuller's stubborn refusal to accept the conventional bifurcation of
ends and means is properly linked to his pragmatist epistemology, 1"
but this important precept is even better supported by drawing
linkages to contemporary hermeneutical and rhetorical philosophy.'
Gadamer invokes Aristotelian natural law as part of his radical
challenge to Cartesian subjectivity, arguing that there is a "nature of
the thing" for many legal and ethical problems that shapes the
138. American pragmatism could serve as a useful intellectual bridge, given its affinities
with Fuller's philosophy, see generally Winston, supra note 83, as well as with the philosophies
of Gadamer and Perelman, see Richard E. Palmer, What Hermeneutics Can Offer Rhetoric, in
RHETORIC AND HERMENEUTICS IN OUR TIME, supra note 40, at 108, 126-27. Of course, the
root of all three approaches is located in Aristotle's ethical philosophy, which proves to be the
radical point of connection.
139. Cf. Kenneth I. Winston, Legislators and Liberty, 13 LAW & PHIL. 389, 400-03 (1994)
(arguing that freedom is crucial for Fuller's philosophy, in the sense of the freedom to
participate effectively in civic processes that dialogically generate substantive values).
140. See Winston, supra note 83, at 329.
141. Two of Fuller's most attuned commentators describe his work in terms that point
toward this hermeneutical-rhetorical model. Kenneth Winston brings together Fuller's
substantive principles of human agency and open communication as related aspects of the
social engagements that subtend law and produce what I have been calling rhetorical
knowledge. See Winston, supra note 139, at 414; Kenneth I. Winston, Introduction, 13 LAW &
PHIL. 253, 258 (1994). Similarly, Peter Teachout emphasizes that Fuller's refusal to accept false
polarities and to develop a reasonable mean is especially evident in Fuller's approach to
adjudication, which I would characterize as an institutional structure oriented toward securing
rhetorical knowledge. See Peter Read Teachout, The Soul of the Fugue: An Essay on Reading
Fuller, 70 MINN. L. REv. 1073, 1140 (1986). Winston and Teachout reach beyond Fuller's
specific arguments to capture a style and epistemological disposition that I believe can best be
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available acceptable resolutions even if it does not determine final
answers for all specific questions.'42 In a similar vein, Perelman
invokes Aristotelian natural law to explain the status of
commonplaces that shape the resolution of legal and moral
argumentation without compelling adherence to a single answer.
This is the same message that Fuller delivers with his analysis of the
inner morality of law: His eight desiderata are not features of a
decisionmaking algorithm, but points of argumentation that respect
the nature of man's social condition.' In the end, Fuller's work is an
attempt to specify different institutionalized forms of discourse that
contribute to the free and open dialogue from which meaningful
substantive aims emerge:
Indeed, at the skeptical extreme, Fuller's view is that the only
adequate idea of the common good is that legislators should
enhance the effective agency of citizens, that is, provide
opportunities for them to collaborate with one another by
means of other mechanisms. In the absence of shared ends,
officials must respect the integrity of emergent efforts at
cooperation in local settings.'"
Gadamer and Perelman emphasize that this is not a "skeptical
extreme" at all, but instead an accurate picture of the operation of
rhetorical knowledge that calls for ongoing theoretical and empirical
research. It should be no surprise that Perelman lists several legal
commonplaces by way of example that match Fuller's desiderata, or
that Fuller's insistence on a pluralism of reasonable legal arguments
matches the same demand for open and honest communication
found in Gadamer's hermeneutics.
It should be even more apparent that Weinreb's natural law
philosophy shares substantial common ground with Gadamer's
hermeneutics and Perelman's rhetoric. The deep nomos that
amounts to a lived experience of normativity in Weinreb's account is
functionally equivalent to Gadamer's notion of traditionary
prejudices and Perelman's notion of commonplaces. Moreover;
Weinreb clearly aligns himself with Gadamer's claim that these
foundational prejudices are changeable because they are subject to
rhetorical elaboration and hermeneutical appropriation in response
to specific problems that require practical resolution. Weinreb's
assessment of the conflict between competing indeterminate
142. GADAMER, supra note 6, at 319.
143. See FULLER, supra note 80, at 93-94 (citing Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics regarding
the inevitability of judgment rooted in contextual understanding).
144. Winston, supra note 139, at 412.
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conceptions of liberty and equality in contemporary political life
evidences this shared understanding:
Their descriptive content, referring to the actual pattern of
liberties and equalities within a community, may acquire
normative significance simply by the reformulation of
conventional principles and practices and normative principles
of social order. Reflecting on what is actually the case, as they
do, such principles are regarded as unexceptional and
objectively valid, or "absolute." In that commonplace habit of
thought is found the true modern analogue of earlier efforts to
perceive a permanent, self-justifying reality in the actual course
of natural and human events. So long as the transference from
the actual to the normative is carried out inexplicitly, by means
of ambiguities within the political vocabulary itself, it passes
unnoticed. One may say that we confuse the familiar with the
necessary. But we have no other choice. 45
Just as Gadamer rescues truth from method, Weinreb rescues
objective norms from rationalism.
Weinreb's inquiries clearly are buttressed by Gadamer's more
ambitious analysis of all understanding. At times, Weinreb's
ontological account of normativity appears to be a kind of special
pleading for a unique status that is wholly distinguished from the
capacity for technical reason. However, Gadamer demonstrates that
all understanding, including the methodological self-understanding
of the human and natural sciences, is rooted in this same
"hermeneutical situation," and so normativity is neither more
objectively real nor less objectively real than scientific consciousness.
By situating Weinreb's account in this broader project, we are in the
best position to dispel the aura of mystery inevitably linked with
invocations of natural law. Moreover, Fuller's attention to
procedural qualities that resonate with the hermeneutical situation
and Perelman's attention to the specific rhetorical practices by which
justice is constituted and apprehended point the way to pragmatic
inquiries that follow from Weinreb's ontological claims. In this
respect, Weinreb is similar to Gadamer, who also tends to focus on
ontological claims at the expense of drawing pragmatic implications
about desirable social forms of organization."' By joining Weinreb to
145. WEINREB, supra note 114, at 231.
146. At one point, Weinreb acknowledges that his inquiry can be broadened, although he
does not seek to work out these implications himself:
How a community's nomos develops and changes, how it is communicated to individuals
within it, how they acquire it and incorporate it within their own experience or reject it
are the subjects of the human sciences-anthropology, sociology, psychology-and lie
1999] 355
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the full breadth of the interpretive turn in philosophical
understanding, his project would take on additional practical
significance for scholars interested in questions of institutional
design and competence.
If Gadamer and Perelman provide detailed and sophisticated
accounts that gird the unconventional natural law approaches taken
by Fuller and Weinreb, it is equally true that these legal scholars
provide an important supplement to the interpretive turn by virtue
of their more specific focus. Fuller champions the inner morality of
law not as a natural law rulebook carved into a timeless stone, but as
part of an effort to uncover principles of institutional structure that
accord with man's hermeneutical-rhetorical nature. To some degree
this second-order scholarly inquiry is an artistic endeavor grounded
in techne, similar to the undertakings of a pastry chef or master
carpenter. Fuller's innovative and valuable studies in eunomics are
scholarly inquiries into rhetorical knowledge in action. Like the
rhetorical handbooks of antiquity, his essays provide needed general
guidance for social practices that cannot be scripted in advance.'7
Fuller's analogies to craftsmen are obfuscating only because the
socio-legal architect does not construct a product according to a plan.
Instead she uncovers baseline organizing norms that respect, are
responsive to, and facilitate man's social nature as a communicative
being.
Although the legal scholar may be like a craftsman in some
respects, it is a fundamental mistake to ignore Fuller's attention to
the intersubjective activity of citizens pursuing rhetorical knowledge.
Fuller's eunomics does not purport to provide the answers to
problems of social life, but instead attempts to identify and describe
the structures within which questions of social life can be resolved by
the affected parties. In his confrontation with Ernest Nagel over his
beyond our immediate interest. All that needs to be stressed is that a community's nomos
provides specific content for the structural fact of human responsibility.
WEINREB, supra note 126, at 152. Of course, the point of the interpretive turn is to place less
confidence in the social sciences and to attend more carefully to the character of the rhetorical
practices that shape the nomos. As I argue below, Weinreb comes closest to pursuing this
project in his analysis of rights discourse.
147. Along these lines, Eugene Garver describes Aristotle's Rhetoric as an examination of
the "art of character," a project that is at once a philosophical inquiry into the nature of civic
life and also an articulation of the parameters within which speakers seek the available means
of persuasion. See EUGENE GARVER, ARISToTLE's RHETORIC: AN ART OF CHARACTER
(1994). Garver describes this curious status of Aristotle's rhetoric in much the same manner
that I would describe Fuller's eunomics:
A civic art of rhetoric will explicate persuasion as something that happens in a speech,
not simply by means of the speech.... Rhetoric is a method for dealing with a domain
apparently beyond method.... Ultimately, the project of the Rhetoric is to construct a
civic relation between argument and ethos, and so between techne and phronesis.
Id at 35, 41, 77.
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(qualified) endorsement of the natural law method, Fuller
emphasizes this distinction:
On the affirmative side, I discern, and share, one central aim
common to all the schools of natural law, that of discovering
those principles of social order which will enable men to attain a
satisfactory life in common. It is an acceptance of the possibility
of "discovery" in the moral realm that seems to me to
distinguish all the theories of natural law from opposing views.
In varying measure, it is assumed in all theories of natural law
that the process of moral discovery is a social one, and that there
is something akin to a "collaborative articulation of shared
purposes" by which men come to understand better their own
ends and to discern more clearly the means for achieving
them.1"
Fuller would be the last person to accord greater significance to the
scholarly activity of outlining basic features of the institutional
structures of democracy than to the unpredictable, hermeneutical-
rhetorical activity of democracy itself. Fuller is an important thinker,
though, because he reminds Gadamer and Perelman that his
practical scholarly activity is no less significant than their
philosophical thinking.
Adopting a hermeneutical-rhetorical orientation leads us to a
more finely calibrated understanding of what Fuller meant by the
internal morality of law and also yields a deeper understanding of
how the internal morality of law relates to substantive morality.
Fuller advocated a natural law philosophy in the classical
(ontological) sense, rather than as a deontological project of human
reason. It would be a grave error to read Fuller as specifying certain
"rules" for good law that are wholly distinct from (even if usually
coincident with) certain "rules" for leading a good life. Law's
internal morality, the morality that makes law possible, derives from
human nature. Principles of appropriate (good and workable) social
organization are not a matter of raw choice for social planners, nor
are they blueprints fortuitously dropped from the rationalist
heavens. Instead, these principles are responsive to our
communicative nature as finite, historical, and socially interpretive
beings. Morality inheres in the project of designing social institutions
precisely because human nature is not infinitely malleable. As Fuller
described in detail, legislation must have certain qualities not as a
formal matter, but so as to operate as a means of social organization
that comports with human nature. There is a deep and inherent
148. Lon L. Fuller, A Rejoinder to Professor Nagel, 3 NAT. LAW FORUM 83,84 (1958).
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connection between the internal morality of law and the substantive
morality of aspiration, then, because the internal morality of law is
responsive to human nature and the morality of aspiration issues
from this same hermeneutical-rhetorical nature in a manner that can
be facilitated by law. The morality that makes law possible
represents a baseline drawn from human nature; in turn, this law
serves to make morality possible by providing the arena in which
citizens can best articulate their aspirations collaboratively. Fuller is
quite correct to keep these two dimensions conceptually distinct as a
methodological strategy for pursuing his eunomics project, but it
remains clear that both moralities are rooted in man's
hermeneutical-rhetorical nature and therefore remain ontologically
joined.
It is no less true that Weinreb's philosophical inquiries can be
viewed as a productive development of the themes of philosophical
hermeneutics. In his most recent book, Weinreb demonstrates how
his natural law philosophy clarifies the vexing problem of human and
civil rights, and therefore brings a gripping, contextual focus to the
broad themes of philosophical hermeneutics.' 9 Weinreb regards
rights "as the normative constituents of persons" located "in the
deep, established ways of a community, its actual practices as well as
its patterns of normative judgment."5 ' Rights "are not what a person
ought to have, but what a person has, or is, simply and entirely as a
person" '151 by virtue of having been socialized into a set of practices.52
The key to Weinreb's ontological analysis of rights is that he suggests
how this philosophical insight translates into a pragmatic program to
facilitate the deep conventions at work in the experience of
normativity by avoiding conceptual misunderstandings. Specifically,
he argues that his approach brings rights down to earth and avoids
the all-or-nothing character of rationalistic inquiry by making clear
that principles reflect the factual circumstances giving rise to rights in
experience, and also that a "useful discussion about specific rights
proceeds not by deductive reasoning but by analogy, not by proof
but persuasion."1 3 In other words, Weinreb claims that there are
general contours for productively engaging in rights discourse that
can be derived from his ontological understanding of rights.
Beginning with the understanding that there can be no formal
structure for rights discourse since there "are no general principles,
149. See WEINREB, supra note 126.
150. Id. at 6, 9.
151. Id. at 7.
152. See id. at 142-48.
153. Id. at 157-60.
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factual or normative, which can themselves be demonstrated and
from which conclusions about specific rights follow," Weinreb
nevertheless reaffirms that "it is possible to reason about rights and,
sometimes, to state confidently a conclusion about what rights there
are." '154 Although Weinreb's discussion would benefit from the
philosophical analysis of the function and practice of rhetoric
developed by Gadamer and Perelman, his considerations of specific
legal disputes concerning the rights of handicapped citizens and the
rights of homosexuals lends a quality of reality to these philosophical
theses. Weinreb's conclusion, that "with respect to rights of the
handicapped and gay rights... the nomos of the community
presently supports a range of specific rights,""15 is less important than
the form that his inquiry takes. Weinreb uncovers the lived
experiences that lie behind the debate over abstract principles,
attempting to foreground how the arguments over rights reflect
commitments far deeper than a concern with logical consistency and
compelling force. Although it is not expressly presented as a
hermeneutical analysis, it is likely that Gadamer would find
satisfaction in Weinreb's approach to rights.
D. The Case of the Speluncean Explorers and the Problem of
Affirmative Action
My thesis that the natural law philosophies of Fuller and Weinreb
are complementary to Gadamer's hermeneutical philosophy in
important ways is demonstrated by discussing a concrete problem
that each scholar employs to highlight his approach. First, I will refer
to one of Fuller's most famous teaching problems, The Case of the
Speluncean Explorers.'56 Fuller's fictional case account poses a
challenging problem because, at first blush, the legal issue seems
quite straightforward but the "correct" result is troubling. The case
concerns the murder convictions of members of a group of trapped
cave-explorers who kill and cannibalize one of their colleagues when
it becomes obvious that they cannot be rescued before they all starve
to death. The hapless Roger Whetmore originally agreed to a neutral
method of choosing who would be sacrificed for the remaining
members of the group, but he then balked shortly before the lots
were drawn. Needless to say, he vigorously protested the group's
decision to kill and eat him after he came up short, but the group
proceeded with its plan. The explorers appealed their convictions to
154. Id. at 169-70.
155. Id. at 194.
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the Supreme Court, arguing that they could not be sentenced to die
under the murder statute in these dramatic circumstances.
I suspect that most people regard the explorers' actions in this case
with some degree of understanding, even though most also would
agree that the definition of murder, read in simple terms, was met.
Fuller's case account consists of several judicial opinions each of
which presents a different resolution of these conflicting
commitments. Each opinion is rooted in a different understanding of
the nature and role of law, with the result that no justice is able to
persuade even one other member of the court to join in his
opinion."' It is not immediately clear to the casual reader what lesson
Fuller intends to teach with this fragmented case report. That there
is a single right answer that is missed by all but one judge? That
there can be no "right" answer, but only a majority decision by
authorized officials? That legal judgment of the actions involved
requires nothing less than full moral judgment? I believe that a
careful reading of Fuller's natural law philosophy reveals that The
Case of the Speluncean Explorers artfully presents the nature of legal
practice as a process of facilitating rhetorical knowledge. Because
Fuller repeatedly stressed that natural law, properly regarded, is not
an answer book for difficult legal problems, it is a mistake to
approach the case by trying to decide which judicial opinion provides
the uniquely correct answer. The beauty and enduring worth of
Fuller's story is to provide a dramatic example of his understanding
of adjudication and the rule of law, an understanding that is rooted
in his conception of the natural law principles attendant to the
pursuit of what I have been calling rhetorical knowledge. No justice,
in his account, can be written off out of hand as thinking or acting
unreasonably, nor does Fuller stack the rhetorical deck
overwhelmingly in favor of one of the judges, although it is plain that
Justice Foster most closely articulates Fuller's own views. Instead,
the reader is treated to a de-centering hermeneutical experience in
which competing rhetorical claims all resonate with the reader's
prejudices and aspirations to some degree, and none quite captures
the reader's allegiance to a degree of absolute certitude. 58 The case
157. Justice Foster contends, in part, that the dire circumstances facing the explorers
amounted to a breakdown in the presuppositions that gird society, resulting in a suspension of
legality itself until the explorers could be rescued. See id. at 621. Chief Justice Truepenny and
Justice Keene contend that the law is the law, and it must be enforced by the judiciary even in
the face of facts evoking sympathy for the defendants. See id. at 619, 632. Justice Handy
contends that respect for law flows from its concretization of the common sense of the
community, which serves as the true guide for decisionmaking. See id. at 643.
158. For example, Justice Handy effectively taunts Justice Foster (Fuller's alter ego) with
stinging barbs, even though Handy endorses a rather crude legal realist model of
decisionmaking that would not be acceptable to many scholars. In his jurisprudence casebook,
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account does not provide alternative answers to the question of the
best judicial method so much as it provides a model of the operation
of legal rationality in the face of a stubbornly undecidable case that
nevertheless must be adjudicated.
When thrown into a hermeneutical-rhetorical event as compelling
as Fuller's hypothetical, it is tempting to suspend judgment until
decisionmaking criteria more stable than the probabilities involved
in rhetorical knowledge can be utilized. This is the posture adopted
by Justice Tatting, who finds that his "mind becomes entangled in
the meshes of the very nets I throw out for my own rescue," leaving
him "unable to resolve the doubts that beset me about the law of this
case."'59  Of course, Fuller's story brilliantly undermines the
legitimacy of surrendering to such an intellectual and emotional
paralysis. Justice Tatting's abstention leaves the court evenly
divided, resulting in the execution of the explorers pursuant to their
conviction below. Refusing to accept the challenge of seeking
rhetorical knowledge is no less a life and death matter than
addressing the demands of the question directly. Acknowledging that
there is more than one reasonable legal solution to a social problem
does not entail that all solutions are reasonable, nor that all
reasonable solutions are equally desirable.
The manner of deliberation and argumentative persuasion
undertaken by the Justices provides a model of Fuller's
understanding of adjudication as a form of social ordering that
facilitates and participates in the substantive requirement of open
communication. Fuller contends that adjudication is "an institutional
framework that is intended to assure to the disputants an
opportunity for the presentation of proofs and reasoned arguments"
about claimed rights and alleged injuries, and thus by its very
institutional nature it respects the "influence of reasoned argument
in human affairs."'" Adjudication is not neutral with respect to
desired ends-it cannot be reduced to a formalistic process of
applying predetermined values to a set of facts -because the court is
"an active participant in the enterprise of articulating the
implications of shared purposes," and the activity of reasoned
argument inevitably draws upon and helps to define a "community
Fuller emphasizes that the reader should not write Justice Handy off as a caricature in order to
avoid having to deal with his challenges. "If there is an element of truth in his point of view, we
need to consider how that element of truth may be embraced within a philosophy of law and
government that does not have the implications which his personal philosophy seems at times
to have." LON L. FULLER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 1 (1949). This is precisely the
scholarly approach that signals Fuller's commitment to rhetorical knowledge rather than to
dialectical demonstration.
159. Fuller, supra note 156, at 631.
160. FULLER, supra note 84, at 93-94.
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of shared purpose."'' 1 In contemporary terminology, Fuller describes
adjudication as an institutional arrangement designed to facilitate
the hermeneutical recognition of issues presented by a given conflict
and to promote the rhetorical elaboration of a reasonable course of
action through reasoned argumentation. It is quite clear in Fuller's
account that there is no theoretical method to short-circuit rhetorical
engagement in adjudication, politics, or social intercourse, and he
insists that adjudication alone cannot accommodate the full range of
rhetorical activity necessary in a complex and diverse society.62 This,
then, is the lesson of The Case of the Speluncean Explorers.
Adjudication provides the rhetorical arena in which some difficult
social problems with multiple reasonable solutions can be assessed
and resolved by articulating the (provisionally) best solution. The
forms of good social order within the adjudicative sphere identified
by Fuller are not simply a matter of pre-existing convention, as one
traditional natural law theorist has alleged;'63 instead, the study of
eunomics represents a detailed (even if unintended) meditation on
the implications for legal process inherent in the substantive morality
that defines law and gives it an institutional inner morality. Holding
oneself open to conversation and the force of the better argument is
161. Id. at 102. This explains the difficulty of securing the rule of law in international
relations despite the presence of adjudicative institutional mechanisms. "Where the only
shared objective is the negative one of preventing a holocaust, there is nothing that can make
meaningful a process of decision that depends upon proofs and reasoned argument." Id.
162. Despite his understandable attention to adjudicative processes, Fuller does not even
claim that adjudication is the quintessential hermeneutical-rhetorical forum. "Polycentric"
problems that involve complex balancing and nuanced and responsive judgments (Fuller's
metaphor is the day-to-day strategic decisions made by a baseball coach), cannot be fully
adjudicated to complete satisfaction. Fuller is convinced that the form of adjudication is well-
suited only to establish the background rules of social intercourse and that more specific
decision-making should be left to the participants in such a well-ordered social sphere.
Not surprisingly, this was Fuller's analysis of the market economy. Although he well
recognized the inevitability and desirability of government intervention into exchange
relationships, Fuller maintained that microeconomic decisions are best left to the ongoing
practices and decisions of members of society:
The working out of our common law of contracts case by case has proceeded through
adjudication, yet the basic principle underlying the rules thus developed is that they
should promote the free exchange of goods in a polycentric market. The court gets into
difficulty, not when it lays down rules about contracting, but when it attempts to write
contracts.
Id. at 120-21; see also id. at 211-46.
In a prescient line of argument, Fuller expresses grave misgivings about the "creeping
legalism" that reduces every rhetorical sphere to an adjudicative model. FULLER, supra note
84, at 78-85. This anticipates JUrgen Habermas's more recent detailed arguments that the
juridification of family relations and educational relationships supplants communicative reason
and participates in the pervasive colonization of the lifeworld by instrumental reason. 2
JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE AMION 356-73 (Thomas McCarthy
trans., Beacon Press 1989) (1981). One need not endorse Habermas's theoretical commitments
to agree with this critical insight and to appreciate Fuller's grasp of the incipient problem.
163. See Miller, supra note 78, at 231.
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the ethical principle at the root of Gadamer's hermeneutics and
Perelman's rhetoric; Fuller's inquiries take account of this principle
of social interaction in the context of legal scholarship. Rather than
seeking definitive answers in legal theory, Fuller demonstrates that
we are best counseled to examine the legal structures within which
pressing problems can best be presented and resolved as part of
ongoing social practices that always are hermeneutically grounded
and rhetorically accomplished.
Weinreb provides an equally compelling practical application of
his natural law philosophy that reinforces the connections between
his approach and the hermeneutical-rhetorical tenets of the
interpretive turn. In his analysis of rights, Weinreb poses what
appears to be a frivolous question but which turns out to be quite
challenging: If a hard-working and dedicated young man with a deep
desire to pitch for the Boston Red Sox tries out for the team but is
turned away because he lacks talent, why do we not take seriously
his claim that he deserves a spot in the pitching rotation? As
Weinreb notes, "we simply conclude that he is 'responsible' for his
lack of physical capacities and deny what he wishes; he has no claim
to the job" in our estimation, whereas we readily conclude that the
members of the team have a right to their positions.1" What is the
ground for this attribution of responsibility for the physical
characteristics that life has dealt the young man, especially in light of
his unmatched devotion and desire to be a pitcher for the Red Sox?
Weinreb immediately defuses the first line of defense: that we are
not talking of anything so grand as "rights" and "responsibilities,"
but instead just the application of criteria that arise within the
narrow confines of a rule-bound game:
It may seem odd to look beyond the conventional way of
choosing players because the status of baseball as a game, a
limited practice governed by conventional rules, is unusually
clear. But "life" is in large measure a composite of just such
practices, not something different and separate from them. Nor
is it self-evident what is and is not a game, governed by special
rules .... [C]hange the venue only a little, from Fenway Park to
Harvard Yard across the river. Is who is admitted to the
university also just a matter of entitlement, governed entirely by
whatever conventional admissions policies are in place? If so,
then any practice at all may elude the demands of justice,
provided only that it conform to its own well-established rules.
But if not, why do we regard the carefree career of an
undergraduate as "life" and the hard schedule of a professional
164. WEINREB, supra note 126, at 72.
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baseball player as only a game?"u
The answer, of course, is that decisions are being made about the
justice of the Red Sox tryouts no less than they are being made about
the justice of the Harvard admissions process. Weinreb adds
complexity to the mix to reinforce this point, noting that a Red Sox
pitcher does not have an unlimited entitlement to the fruits of his
physical capacities since we may find it just to tax his income to
provide student loans to individuals such as the young man turned
away from spring practice tryouts. The complex social practices that
adjudicate the desert and entitlements of these persons go to the
heart of Weinreb's natural law philosophy. Later in the book he
addresses these complexities by providing an extended discussion of
the problem of affirmative action, "if only to defend the national
pastime," he notes with only partial irony."
The question of affirmative action challenges our sense of justice
quite unlike other public policy questions, Weinreb contends,
because it brings sharply into relief the antinomic commonplaces of
liberty and equality that are the mainsprings of our nomos, equally
implicating our social acknowledgment of responsibility for one's
situation as just desert and an entitlement to assistance as a matter of
right:
We should not expect that disagreement and confusion about
affirmative action will be resolved even over a long period of
time. The community may come to regard long-standing
practices as an acceptable political solution or simply as "the
law." But no solution will be incorporated within the
community's nomos as just, because the terms of the
controversy preclude a consistent understanding of
responsibility and rights. 7
Defenders of affirmative action argue that members of groups that
have suffered and continue to suffer discrimination do not deserve
their situation, which bears the marks of this discrimination in untold
ways, whereas opponents argue that they are not responsible for
actions of others in the past. "Both make precise claims that leave us
right in the paradox of the human condition."'" Weinreb believes
that there can be no definitive resolution of a debate framed in this
manner, for it replicates the internal tensions of the lived ideal of
justice itself.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 73.
167. Id. at 191.
168. Id. at 190.
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The example of affirmative action is provocative. Weinreb argues
that natural law cannot deliver an answer to the dilemma because
the social practices that are the ground of natural law are locked in
irreconcilable opposition. Natural law provides easy answers to most
questions of desert and responsibility just because these answers are
implemented in the course of everyday life with little or no
reflection, often within a relatively simple descriptive account of the
matter in question, such as "'that young man couldn't strike out my
grandmother.""'69 But it is precisely this concrete quality of natural
law that necessarily opens the possibility that some problems cannot
be resolved because they are framed in a manner that replicates "the
antinomy of reason that gives rise to rights as the foundation of
justice" in our society. 7° This is an important and easily missed
insight, and represents the obverse of one of Gadamer's most
repeated points about hermeneutical understanding: A prejudiced
forestructure of meanings is not a regrettable limitation on
understanding, but rather provides the ground for our ability to
understand at all. 7' The cost of knowledge is the inability to secure
complete, absolute knowledge; the cost of objective moral
experience is to be situated in a practical context and denied the
God's-eye view from nowhere.
What can a legal scholar say about the question of affirmative
action, if indeed it represents the unresolvable tension of liberty and
equality in modem life? Weinreb's response is unclear. On one hand,
he suggests that the stalemate in the natural law discourse over
desert and responsibility means that the issue must be dealt with in
terms of ongoing political compromise, preferably by legislative
action rather than adjudication." This appears eminently sensible
and accords with Fuller's conception of the role of adjudication as
unfit for certain social issues, but it is not clear that so easy an answer
is available. At the beginning of his discussion, Weinreb argues that
the question of affirmative action cannot be resolved solely at the
level of social policy because the questions involved are so deeply
connected to the constitutive features of our nomos.73 The most
coherent reading of these seemingly contradictory statements is that
Weinreb argues that we cannot contain the question at the level of
social policy, but that upon deep reflection we must be content to
169. Id. at 60, 64.
170. Id. at 194.
171. See GADAMER, supra note 6, at 361 ("To be situated within a tradition does not limit
the freedom of knowledge but makes it possible").
172. See WEINREB, supra note 126, at 192.
173. See id. at 189.
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resolve it at that level.
However, in concluding his discussion, Weinreb does more than
relegate the issue to crude political horse-trading. Reflection and
further elaboration of the principles of justice that are operative in
society are still possible if we devise a means of steering social
processes away from these troubling dead-ends of practical reason:
Substantively, affirmative action programs should shift as much
as is practicable from measures that are directly and overtly
competitive to ones that are not. Instead of preferential
selection of applicants for a limited number of places,
[completely distinct social] programs should be designed to
enhance the capabilities of members of groups that suffered the
effects of past discrimination, who should then compete without
preference for the available places. 7
Weinreb does not claim that there is an easy solution that has gone
unnoticed, but that reframing the question will be more productive:
Enhancement programs are not without cost, which must be met
by the diversion of public funds from elsewhere or by increased
taxation of private funds. The increase of power of those who
benefit is matched by reduced power of those who are obliged
to support the programs. But the right to keep one's property
free from taxation is not widely asserted anymore; and the
tradeoff of rights of those who benefit from taxation and those
who are burdened is much less keenly felt. There are not
specific winners and losers, as there are if persons compete
directly for positions.175
The broader scope of Gadamer's philosophical inquiries into the
hermeneutical-rhetorical nature of human understanding
underwrites this move by Weinreb as something more than mere
political compromise. The manner in which the debate over
affirmative action is framed admits of no just resolution because
constitutive elements of our lived experience of justice are thrown
into fundamental opposition to each other, but this does not mean
that it is impossible to deliberate about the justice of affirmative
action. Weinreb demonstrates that a reconceptualization of the
problem, which requires a high degree of hermeneutical sensitivity
and rhetorical competence as described by Gadamer, can move a
localized debate about justice to a more productive plane.
Weinreb has brilliantly shown the power of natural law thinking by
174. Id. at 193.
175. Id.
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presenting an insoluble case that requires a refashioning of the
commonplaces of justice to frame better the problem and open fresh
avenues of inquiry and deliberation. Natural law is not the guarantor
of correct moral and legal judgment, it is the ground from which
moral and legal judgment issues and against which such judgment is
assessed. Weinreb exemplifies the situation not only of the legal
philosopher, but of all persons facing moral decisions, when he
merges his descriptive account of the practices that generate the
debate over affirmative action with his prescription for easing the
conflict. Weinreb, joining Fuller, contends that the rigorous
bifurcation of "is" and "ought" cripples moral theorizing because it
contradicts the experience of moral decisionmaking. We are the
practices that we assess according to the criteria of the practices. In
this paradox lies the wisdom of the classical natural law.
IV. NATURAL LAW AFTER THE INTERPRETIVE TURN: A
GADAMERIAN AccouNT OF LAW IN FLUX
We have thus made a problem for ourselves by confusing the
intelligible with the fixed. We think that making sense out of life
is impossible unless the flow of events can somehow be fitted
into a framework of rigid forms. To be meaningful, life must be
understandable in terms of fixed ideas and laws, and these in
turn must correspond to unchanging and eternal realities behind
the shifting scene. But if this is what "making sense out of life"
means, we have set ourselves the impossible task of making
fixity out of flux.
Struggle as one may, "fixing" will never make sense out of
change. The only way to make sense out of change is to plunge
into it, move with it, and join the dance.
-Alan Watts76
Developing the connections between Gadamer's philosophical
hermeneutics (as informed by Perelman's rhetoric) and the natural
law philosophies espoused by Fuller and Weinreb has been a
complicated endeavor. Because there is no neat intellectual history
to be traced in summary fashion, the project might appear at times to
be provocative reporting rather than reasoned elaboration. But
drawing these connections proves important and illuminating. We
gain an increased understanding of the task of legal theory after the
176. ALAN WATrs, THE WISDOM OF INSECURITY 43-44 (1951).
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interpretive turn and also a more sophisticated understanding of the
contours of the interpretive turn in light of our legal practices. It
remains my task to underscore these gains in a practical manner.
The legal system is now a central feature of social organization,
intervening substantially in matters of politics, relations of economic
exchange, and even family relations."7 Seemingly no aspect of
contemporary life remains immune to the juridification of
interpersonal relations.78 The agora is now only faintly replicated in
shopping malls and CNN-produced "town meetings," and the power
of medieval religious consciousness and the organizing functions of
church bureaucracy are now only faintly replicated in the
administrative secular state. In these circumstances, the rhetorical
contests in courtrooms and legislative chambers across the country
shape our public space as much as any other set of practices. Legal
argumentation need not deal explicitly with matters of grave public
import to effectuate its public function, since even the most simple
dispute concerning alleged contractual obligations implicates basic
questions of socially defined rights and duties.
Acknowledging the character of modern law, Gadamer and
Perelman both look to the legal system as a manifestation of the
cultural dynamics that they explore in their philosophies. The central
problem of jurisprudence-accounting for the experience of stability
within the tumultuous flux that is human existence-is the central
177. The pervasiveness of legal authority is reflected in the good-natured opinion by a
federal district court judge who dismissed a suit brought by an individual seeking redress for a
deprivation of his civil rights by "Satan and his staff." United States ex. rel. Mayo v. Satan and
His Staff, 54 F.R.D. 282 (W.D. Pa. 1971). Is it really surprising that a citizen who believes that
"Satan has on numerous occasions caused plaintiff misery and ... has placed deliberate
obstacles in his path and has caused plaintiff's downfall," id at 282, would demand legal
redress? Is it really surprising that the judge could write a traditional (even if tongue-in-cheek)
legal analysis of the procedural bars to suit? America is a nation of lawyers, we are told, but
this is due to the fact that America is profoundly shaped by law and legal consciousness.
178. Jirgen Habermas characterizes the juridification of social life as a colonization of the
hermeneutically-secured lifeworld by the system imperatives of modem legal institutions, and
he refers to the increased regulation of family life and educational relationships as examples of
this potentially dysfunctional development:
The formalization of relationships in family and school means, for those concerned, an
objectivization and removal from the lifeworld of (now) formally regulated social
interaction in family and school. As legal subjects they encounter one another in an
objectivizing, success-oriented attitude.... If... the structure of juridification requires
administrative and judicial controls that do not merely supplement socially integrated
contexts with legal institutions, but convert them over to the medium of law, then
functional disturbances arise.
HABERMAS, supra note 162, at 369. The importance of the legal system to modem political
theory and sociological understanding is perhaps most dramatically confirmed by Habermas's
recent sustained effort to reconcile legal theory and democratic theory in a manner that is
informed by his philosophical elaboration of a discourse ethics. See JURGEN HABERMAS,
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND
DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992).
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problem of post-Enlightenment philosophical inquiry as well. But
the problem can be more provocatively posed by confronting legal
practice with contemporary philosophical critique and asking: How is
it possible to account for law if we cannot escape our character as
historical, finite beings buffeted by the flux of existence? It is this
question that leads postmodern and deconstructionist legal theorists
to shrug their shoulders without regret. Whether natural law
thinking is relevant after the interpretive turn appears beside the
point. The real question is whether law can survive the interpretive
turn.
I will marshal the insights of Gadamer, Perelman, Fuller, and
Weinreb to address this question, but I begin my discussion by
returning to Justice Souter's opinion in the assisted suicide cases in
order to ground my theoretical discussion in a pragmatic context.
Souter issued his opinion in response to litigation challenging the
constitutionality of criminal laws enacted by the states of
Washington and New York that prohibited assisting another person
to commit suicide. These cases attracted a great deal of attention and
spurred controversy. For one thing, the cases present the dilemma of
judicial review in sharp relief: The nearly universal practice of
prohibiting assisted suicide was challenged on behalf of individuals
who claimed that this democratic legislative action was an
unwarranted infringement on their individual rights. Moreover, the
breathtaking advances in medical diagnosis and technology during
the past century that have extended life spans without conquering
mortality have transformed the question of assisted suicide by
terminally ill persons into a matter of passionate debate and pressing
urgency. Justice Souter confronted this troubling issue with the firm
conviction that judicial review demands the exercise of reasonable
judgment,'79 a conception that provides an excellent touchstone for
reflecting on the paradox of law within flux.
Souter begins his opinion by explaining the persistence of
substantive due process analysis despite the widely perceived
deficiencies of some of the most prominent cases to advance the
doctrine."s Following Justice Harlan's famous dissent in Poe v.
Ullman, Souter concludes that substantive due process analysis has
endured because it is "nothing more than what is required by the
179. Of course, the paradox of law within flux lies at the root of the problem in defining
the rule of law as something distinct from the rule of men and women. See Mootz, Rethinking,
supra note 5, at 149-64 (describing the experience of constrained innovation as the ground of
the rule of law).
180. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2277-81 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring)
(discussing a doctrinal legacy that includes widely criticized cases such as Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
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judicial authority and obligation to construe constitutional text and
review legislation for conformity to that text." '81 Souter emphasizes
that Harlan eschewed an ideological approach and paid judicious
attention to detail and nuance in cases involving substantive due
process challenges to state statutes." Souter congratulates Harlan
for openly accepting the unavoidable task of balancing individual
liberty and state authority. According to Souter, substantive due
process challenges require the Court first to identify individual
interests "worthy of constitutional protection" and the opposing
social interests, and then to assess whether the legislation in question
falls within a reasonable range of legitimate resolutions of the
conflict between the two interests or instead amounts to an arbitrary
and purposeless restraint on the individual. 3 Souter emphatically
rejects the Court's pretense of identifying "fundamental"
constitutional rights that exist as "extratextual absolutes,"'' " and he
argues that Harlan's common-law style balancing is the core of the
substantive due process tradition. Souter explains that the Lochner-
era economic due process cases are "deviant" precisely because they
pursued "absolutist implementation" of abstract rights rather than
attending to the details of the case before the Court."
181. Id. at 2281 (Souter, J., concurring).
182. It is difficult to pigeonhole Justice Harlan in the customary conservative-liberal
matrix. A leading legal theorist and former clerk to Justice Harlan claims that he was "a true
conservative-a judicial conservative and a conservative in social philosophy." Kent
Greenawalt, Justice Harlan's Conservatism and Alternative Possibilities, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 53, 65 (1991). Justice Harlan's biographer describes him as "not only open-minded" but
"cosmopolitan in taste and outlook" and impatient "with provincialism and intolerance."
Tinsley E. Yarbrough, Mr. Justice Harlan: Reflections of a Biographer, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
223, 239-40 (1991). Harlan was known as the "great dissenter" in the liberal Warren Court era,
see TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: GREAT DISSENTER OF THE
WARREN COURT (1992), but liberal legal theorists have credited him with articulating some of
the more enduring rationales for rights-based advances in constitutional law during this period,
see, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 76-79
(1991) (praising the Poe dissent); Gerald Gunther, Another View of Justice Harlan-A
Comment on Fried and Ackerman, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rev. 67, 70 (1991) ("I have always
thought it ironic, but not surprising, that the best part of the free speech legacy of the Warren
Court, the part that has proved most lasting, came not from the pens of that Court's liberals,
but rather, repeatedly, from Justice Harlan."); Nadine Strossen, Justice Harlan and the Bill of
Rights: A Model for How a Classic Conservative Court Would Enforce the Bill of Rights, 36
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133 (1991) (praising Harlan's respect for civil rights). My discussion is
focused strictly on a single opinion by Justice Souter, but my reading may very well help to cast
light on Harlan's notoriously curious "natural law" approach to substantive due process
adjudication.
183. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2283 (Souter, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 2281, 2283 n.10 (Souter, J., concurring). Souter does acknowledge that the
characterization of some rights as "fundamental" is helpful if what is meant is that the
legislative action will be assessed more strictly, or in other words that the range of
reasonableness within which the legislature may act will be drawn more narrowly. Id. at 2283
n.9 (Souter, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 2279 (Souter, J., concurring).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority of the Court,
rejects Souter's reading of the legal tradition and argues that
substantive due process adjudication can rise above the subjective
value preferences of the judge only if constitutional protection is
limited to individual fundamental rights that are objectively rooted
deep in the nation's history, tradition, and practices." Wary of
repeating the Lochner mistake, the Court traditionally limits
constitutional protection to fundamental rights, and then further
attempts to constrain judicial discretion by limiting fundamental
rights to those principles and practices deeply rooted in history.
Following this methodology, Rehnquist rejects arguments in favor of
recognizing a constitutional right to assisted suicide by reciting the
long history of legal opposition to suicide and the continuing near-
universal ban in "civilized" countries on assisting another person to
commit suicide."D Rehnquist's deference to a supposed objective
reality of history raises profound problems," but he issues a
legitimate pragmatic challenge to Souter: What is to serve as the
scale for balancing interests in the absence of "objective" history?
Souter's response to this challenge is somewhat opaque, but drawing
out his argument moves us to the crux of the jurisprudential
question.
Justice Souter's understanding of the nature and practice of
argumentative reason, as it is exercised in substantive due process
cases, provides a concrete example of the themes in this article.
Abandoning hope of developing a formal methodology for
determining substantive rights, Souter nevertheless insists that
adjudication is constrained by the ordinary strictures of critical
discourse. "The inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive
due process claims may call upon the Court in interpreting the
Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by tradition courts
186. See id. at 2268.
187. Id. at 2263. Rehnquist summarizes his position quite effectively: "To hold for
respondents, we would have to reverse centuries of legal doctrine and practice, and strike
down the considered policy choice of almost every state." Id. at 2269.
188. Even if it were possible to avoid the radical historicist critique of objective history,
see, e.g., JOSEPH MARGOLIS, THE FLUX OF HISTORY AND THE FLUX OF SCIENCE (1993)
[hereinafter, MARGOLIS, FLUX OF HISTORY]; JOSEPH MARGOLIS, INTERPRETATION
RADICAL BUT NOT UNRULY: THE NEW PUZZLE OF THE ARTS AND HISTORY (1995)
[hereinafter MARGOLIS, INTERPRETATION RADICAL], Rehnquist's formulation appears to
extend constitutional protection only when the legal and social traditions have clearly
established the existence of the right being asserted, and so his view of constitutional liberties
amounts to protection against a rogue legislature that suddenly "takes back" freedoms openly
acknowledged in the past. Justice Souter characterizes this narrow view as "equating
reasonableness with past practice described at a very specific level." Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at
2281 (Souter, J., concurring).
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always have exercised: reasoned judgment.""' Souter emphasizes
that Harlan championed the tradition of substantive due process
jurisprudence not as a vehicle for courts to make policy decisions,
but as a principled assessment of whether legislative policy decisions
fall within the zone of reasonableness.
First and foremost, the persuasiveness of a litigant's claim is
strongly influenced by how broadly she expresses the competing
interests, and the result in a case often is determined by how broadly
the Court chooses to characterize the interests at stake. The assisted
suicide cases demonstrate this feature of critical discourse quite
distinctly. Chief Justice Rehnquist characterized the question before
the Court as whether individuals have a constitutional right to "aid
another person to commit suicide,"'" whereas Justice Souter
characterized the claimed interest as being much more narrow in
scope: "[W]e are faced with an individual claim not to a right on the
part of just anyone to help anyone else commit suicide under any
circumstances, but to the right of a narrow class to help others also in
a narrow class under a set of limited circumstances."19' It is no
exaggeration to conclude that these different formulations explain
much of the substantial differences in the resulting analyses.
It may not be clear what constraint inheres in the seemingly
destablizing acknowledgment that framing a question is an important
factor in analyzing the question, but it is at this point that Souter
would insist upon close attention to the factual circumstances
surrounding the claimed right. Courts are not competent to issue
advisory opinions that declare broad constitutional rights in advance
of disputes because the rights in question emerge only from the
details of practical confrontations rather than as deductions from
guiding principles. Therefore, the Court must assess the "good
reasons" offered by the parties to justify the desired result-good
reasons that are rooted in the constitutional tradition but are not
189. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2284 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992)). Souter's opinion in Glucksberg
provides the detailed backing for the plurality opinion in Casey, which similarly invoked
Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 849-50.
190. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2269 (quoting the language of the state criminal statute
under attack).
191. Id. at 2286 (Souter, J., concurring). At the outset, Souter emphasizes that plaintiffs
appealing from summary judgment are entitled to a judicial presumption that all contested
factual disputes will be resolved in their favor at trial. Moreover, Souter is careful to note that
the plaintiffs are challenging the statutes only as applied to mentally competent, terminally ill
patients who have made a knowing and voluntary decision to end their life with a physician's
assistance. The plaintiffs sought relief only from an absolute ban on this practice by the state
and readily conceded the state's constitutional authority to impose reasonable regulations to
ensure that assistance is rendered only to those persons making a free and informed decision to
commit suicide. See id. at 2276.
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necessarily equivalent to historically recognized rights:
Common-law method tends to pay respect.., to detail, seeking
to understand old principles afresh by new examples and new
counterexamples. The "tradition is a living thing," albeit one
that moves by moderate steps carefully taken. "The decision of
an apparently novel claim must depend on grounds which follow
closely on well-accepted principles and criteria. The new
decision must take its place in relation to what went before and
further [cut] a channel for what is to come." Exact analysis and
characterization of any due process claim is critical to the
method and to the result."
Souter insists that the refusal to criminalize suicide in America
reflects part of the long legal tradition respecting a person's bodily
integrity, a tradition that is demonstrated with greatest pertinence by
the Court's holding in the abortion cases that a woman has the right
to secure medical assistance to terminate her pregnancy.93 This
general feature of American legal and social traditions does not
provide the answer to the dispute, since it must be translated to the
complex social, psychological, economic, and bureaucratic settings in
which the practice of assisted suicide would take place,' but there is
a necessary interplay between contextual analysis and recourse to
generalized principles that extend beyond traditionary
understandings.
Justice Souter concurs with the result reached by the majority
because he finds that the state ban on assisted suicide does not
interfere with the humane care of terminally ill patients and
represents a reasonable approach to the problem of involuntary
euthanasia. He rests his decision on the pragmatic realities attendant
192. Id. at 2284 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542, 544
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (citations omitted).
193. See id. at 2288 (Souter, J., concurring). The most telling feature of the majority
opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist is the point at which he demonstrates that the
abortion cases do not compel the conclusion that there is a constitutional right to assistance in
committing suicide, coupled with absolute silence about whether these cases lend any
persuasive force to the plaintiffs claim. See id. at 2270-71. Rehnquist invokes history only
selectively-the abortion cases clearly are deemed outside the legitimate history of due process
clause jurisprudence, with the result that they are read as narrowly as possible-providing an
object lesson in why history cannot provide the objective ground of decisionmaking that he
purportedly desires. The Court's generalized rhetoric about judicial deference to deeply rooted
features of our social and legal history carries tremendous persuasive force. However, the
analysis of the facts of the case before the court is facially manipulative and dismissive of the
full history of due process jurisprudence and the actual practices surrounding the care of
terminally ill people.
194. Of course, Justice Souter does not pretend that he has provided such a detailed and
nuanced contextual analysis in a judicial opinion. In large part, his decision to concur in the
result reached by the majority is motivated by his belief that legislatures are more competent
to make such assessments at this point in time. See id. at 2293 (Souter, J., concurring).
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to recognizing the right in question rather than on a concern with
ensuring the conceptual rigor of a deferential substantive due
process jurisprudence. Souter agrees with the majority that a "case
for the slippery slope is fairly made out" in the case, but it is the
slippery slope of unforeseen and unwelcome expansion of the
practice of assisted suicide that might follow from overturning the
criminal laws rather than a slippery slope of unprincipled
decisionmaking.'95 Souter concurs in the result only; his reasoning
and method of justification is markedly different from the majority
approach. In what follows I argue that Souter's hermeneutic attitude
in deciding this case represents a realistic portrayal of natural law
decisionmaking after the interpretive turn in a manner that
illuminates Gadamer's philosophy. More succinctly characterized,
Souter demonstrates how there can be law in flux.
One might expect that conservatives and liberals alike would fear
that Souter is embracing a mysterious natural law account of rights,
untethered from objective criteria and ultimately a matter of the
subjective preference of the judge."9 The natural law philosophies
developed by Lon Fuller and Lloyd Weinreb help to assuage this
fear. Fuller's conception of natural law as a method is closely linked
to Deweyan pragmatism, and he forcefully rejects the traditional
natural law effort to deduce substantive principles of morality.
Fuller's approach underwrites Souter's rejection of extra-textual
absolutes as grounds for constitutional rights in favor of a rich,
contextual analysis of the details of the situation in light of evolving
principles and traditions. Clearly, the statutes banning assisted
195. Id. at 2791 (Souter, J., concurring).
196. Souter's concurring opinion was joined expressly by no other Justice. Similarly, the
plurality opinion in Casey, generally understood to have been authored by Justice Souter, did
not gain a majority.
Justice Scalia has challenged Souter's approach, arguing in his Casey opinion that an
invocation of "reasoned judgment" ultimately reaches toward "nothing but philosophical
predilection and moral intuition." Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 1000 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Moreover, he insisted
that the uncertainty and instability that has plagued Roe v. Wade and its progeny demonstrates
the "emptiness" of the concept of reasoned judgment. id. at 982.
More recently, Justice Scalia reacted with alarm to Justice Souter's opinion in County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998), a case holding that a police officer did not deprive
a motorcycle passenger of his substantive due process right to life by engaging in a high-speed
chase at close distance. Although Scalia concurred in the judgment, he equated Justice Souter's
"shocks the conscience test" with the "atavistic methodology" that the Court had specifically
rejected in Glucksberg. Id. at 1724. Scalia derided the apparently boundless subjectivity in
Souter's approach and refused to consider whether his "unelected conscience" had been
shocked. Id.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy (joined by Justice O'Connor) emphasized that
the "shocks the conscience" test must be understood as an objective test that is informed by
tradition, precedent, and historical understandings. See id. at 1721-22 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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suicide meet Fuller's criteria of law and cannot be disregarded as null
acts. But Fuller's natural law method reaches beyond this bare
procedural lesson and provides a model of adjudicating troubling
issues that present a conflict between deeply rooted moral beliefs
within a tradition. Legal institutions can foster practical reasoning
about desirable moral ends and appropriate means of achieving
them, Fuller stressed, and "social architects" should honor one
substantive directive above all: Open up communication for the kind
of deliberation and decisionmaking undertaken by Souter.
Moreover, Fuller's close analysis of the various modes of lawmaking
available to foster such communication lends support to Souter's
conclusion that the question of assisted suicide is better addressed by
legislative bodies, at least at the present time.
Weinreb's natural law account of moral commitments as lived
experiences rather than as the dictates of reason also serves to clarify
Souter's substantive due process jurisprudence. Weinreb explains
that morality is a structural feature of our existence, defined by
deeply constitutive conventions even as it works at times to
challenge conventional behavior. He provides a sophisticated
account that underwrites the intuitions that lead Souter to embrace
Justice Harlan's seemingly curious commitment to tradition and
contextual decisionmaking as the appropriate grounds from which to
criticize certain conventions. When the debate over affirmative
action deadlocks in the antinomy of liberty and equality, Weinreb
counsels a rhetorical reconfiguration that can foster reasonable
action and a further development of social traditions. In similar
fashion, Souter is wary of becoming trapped in a battle of abstract
ideals and he holds open the possibility that further constitutional
review will be appropriate as contexts and background assumptions
about assisted suicide continue to change.1"
Souter's opinion represents the kind of adjudication that is
anticipated in the non-traditional natural law orientations developed
by Fuller and Weinreb. Reconceived as the effort to develop a
heterogeneous and dynamic natural law approach to the
adjudication of constitutional rights, Souter's analysis acquires
greater depth while still preserving its pragmatic qualities. Souter's
description of legal reasoning is perhaps best captured in Philip
Selznick's description of the "community of reason" that girds moral
197. Cf. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267, 464 n.677 (1998) (citing with approval Justice
Souter's "intriguing suggestion" that the Court need not declare that a state practice either is
constitutional or unconstitutional, but instead can permit continued "democratic
experimentalism" by the states, subject to further judicial review).
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reflection."l In a manner that is congenial to Fuller and Weinreb's
work, Selznick contends that moral reason is anchored in an
objective conventional order that is developed through practical
reasoning, and that this practical reasoning at times presses beyond
conventions by reconstructing elements of received tradition.
Selznick's understanding of the dynamics of moral knowledge
matches Justice Souter's similarly worded depiction of the critical
component embedded in common law decisionmaking:
Critical morality is not made up out of whole cloth; it is not a
rootless figment of the moral imagination. Rather, it is grounded
in the experience and ethos of a particular culture and, at the
same time, reaches within and beyond that experience for
objectively warranted principles of criticism. We have no real
choice. The pre-judgments that form our minds are necessary
starting points for moral reflection. Indeed they are more than
starting points. They are necessary to reflection because they
are, in varying degrees, vehicles of congealed meaning and tacit
understanding."l
Like Souter, Selznick insists that the grounds for objective
experience also contain the motivation for critical reflection:
From the standpoint of critical morality.., parochial experience
may not be taken as final or treated as an unqualified end in
itself. There must be a corollary commitment to press the
particular into the service of the general, that is, to draw from
one's special history a universal message. To do so is, inevitably,
to create a basis for criticizing one's own heritage, not only from
within but also from the standpoint of others' experiences and
more comprehensive interests."
Moral reflection proves to be a suitable model for legal reasoning
(and vice versa), even though it is important to distinguish the
different contexts in which moral judgment and legal judgment take
place and the different purposes each serves. Souter does not
expressly adopt a natural law position, but his approach to
constitutional adjudication of due process rights makes the most
198. Philip Selznick, The Idea of a Communitarian Morality, 75 CAL. L. REv. 445 (1987).
Selznick develops his ideas at length in PHmIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH:
SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY (1992). Selznick's adoption of Dewey's
pragmatic naturalism provides strong links to Fuller, whom he cites with approval, and his
contention that we need to move beyond a purely procedural reading of Fuller's internal
morality of law matches my reading of Weinreb's contribution to the non-traditional reading of
natural law philosophy.
199. Selznick, supra note 198, at 460-61.
200. Id. at 461.
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sense when it is characterized in terms of the pragmatic and
ontological accounts offered by Fuller and Weinreb.
This natural law reading of Souter's due process jurisprudence
aligns his practical activity with Gadamer's philosophical
hermeneutics. Using the natural law philosophies of Fuller and
Weinreb as helpful bridges, Souter's jurisprudence and Gadamer's
philosophy represent expressions of the same experience, although
these expressions fall on opposite ends of the practice-theory
continuum. Gadamer does not regard legal practice as a technical
discipline removed from the intellectual rigor of philosophical
inquiry, but instead looks to legal practice as a compelling
manifestation of the hermeneutical situation that is the focus of his
philosophy. As Gadamer insists, legal practice provides a model of
the relationship between past and present that is the cornerstone of
human understanding. 1 Souter's effort to adjudicate with integrity
the claims made by terminally ill patients and their physicians
represents a conscious effort to hold himself open to the
complexities of the case before the Court while remaining true to
broader guiding principles that emerge from a developing tradition.
This is precisely the activity that Gadamer analyzes in his discussion
of the application of a traditionary text to the present concerns of the
reader. Like Souter, Gadamer argues that application "does not
mean first understanding a given universal in itself and then
afterward applying it to a concrete case. [Application] is the very
understanding of the universal - the text - itself. '2"
Souter's legal pragmatics also illuminates the importance of the
tradition of rhetoric to Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics.
Applying a governing text to a contemporary dispute involves the
interpenetration of the universal and the contextual, an event that is
captured not only in the classical natural law tradition but also in the
classical rhetorical tradition espoused by Vico and transformed by
Perelman. The significance that Gadamer places on argumentation
as a refashioning of prejudgments is matched by Souter's description
of the adjudicative task. Souter's practice affirms that rhetorical
knowledge is possible and that human understanding is dialogical by
establishing that substantive due process is not mere whim or an
arbitrary assertion of power. The classical conception of rhetoric as
201. Gadamer writes:
The judge who adapts the transmitted law to the needs of the present is undoubtedly
seeking to perform a practical task, but his interpretation of the law is by no means
merely for that reason an arbitrary revision. Here again, to understand and to interpret
means to discover and recognize a valid meaning.
GADAMER, supra note 6, at 328.
202. Id. at 341.
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logos, which I have termed "rhetorical knowledge," is the core of
Gadamer's philosophy and Souter's practice.
It may not yet be clear what comfort is gained by acknowledging
that Souter's judicial opinion meshes quite nicely with Gadamer's
philosophical hermeneutics. Can Gadamer's philosophical writings
provide a deeper theoretical understanding that reaffirms the
legitimacy of-or even provide guidelines for improving - Souter's
judicial practice? Gadamer famously argues that the principal cause
of the modernist intellectual predicament has been the illegitimate
extension of the methodology of the natural sciences to humanistic
inquiry, leading most commentators to conclude that Gadamer
rejects the idea of developing a methodology of interpretation. In
fact, this conclusion is directly at odds with Gadamer's philosophy.
As Gary Madison emphasizes, Gadamer rejects the expansion of
formal methodology - a technique that delivers exact knowledge - to
the humanities, but he does not foreclose the development of
rhetorical principles to serve as aids in exercising good judgment
when choosing between competing interpretations: 20 3
There can be no science of interpretation. This however, does
not mean that interpretation cannot be a rigorous (if not an
exact) discipline, an art in the proper sense of the term, and that
one cannot rationally evaluate interpretations.
... It becomes perfectly reasonable to say that while no
interpretation can ever be shown to be the "correct" one, some
interpretations are, nonetheless, clearly better than others.2"
Gadamer's hermeneutical ontology implies a rhetorically based
epistemology, a set of guiding principles by which legal practice can
be assessed and criticized, even if without scientific precision and
determinacy. Gadamer provides the theoretical backing for the
practices that constitute law within flux; not in the sense of
authorizing those practices from a privileged perch of reason, but in
the sense of drawing general conclusions about the contours of those
practices and describing how those practices may be fostered.
Gadamer develops what can be fairly termed a "methodology of
rhetorical knowledge" in his recovery of the concept of human
"experience" from the ahistorical attitude of methodological
science .2 ' Recalling Aristotle's famous metaphor of disparate
203. See MADISON, supra note 13, at 28.
204. Id. at 31, 34-35. This is the same point made by Georgia Warnke in the course of
developing Gadamer's insight that all understanding involves an "anticipation of
completeness" by the interpreter. See Warnke, Law, supra note 4, at 409-12; see also Warnke,
Reply, supra note 4, at 440.
205. See GADAMER, supra note 6, at 346-62; JAMES RISSER, HERMENEUTICS AND THE
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observations coalescing into knowledge like a fleeing army that
suddenly, one by one, turns and stands fast in a unified manner to
meet the enemy, Gadamer argues that the flux of human experience
does yield provisional stability.'l He radicalizes Aristotle's analysis,
though, by rejecting the presumption that the army originally stood
fast before being thrown into only temporary disarray. Gadamer
insists that the flux of experience is primordial and that "everything
is co-ordinatedin a way that is ultimately incomprehensible" through
a never ending series of experiences.' ° Gadamer concludes that,
notwithstanding the lack of fixed and eternal grounds, experience
educates principally because it conditions us to remain open to new
experiences:
The truth of experience always implies an orientation toward
new experience. [The experienced person proves to be]
someone who is radically undogmatic; who, because of the many
experiences he has had and the knowledge he has drawn from
them, is particularly well equipped to have new experiences and
to learn from them. The dialectic of experience has its proper
fulfillment not in definitive knowledge but in the openness to
experience that is made possible by experience itself.... Thus,
experience is experience of human finitude."°
The methodology of acquiring rhetorical knowledge, then, is to
cultivate an openness to further experience.
Gadamer distinguishes genuine hermeneutical experience from
two modes of inauthentic experience. On the one hand, an
interpreter might objectify her experience by subjecting it to the
methodology of the natural sciences and seeking universal
patterns.' ° In legal theory this attitude is exemplified by dominant
approaches in the law and economics movement. Although this
objectifying attitude can be productive in certain contexts, by
distancing the interpreter from the experience it thereby sharply
limits what can be gained. On the other hand, an interpreter might
co-opt an experience by presuming to understand it in its full
historical significance as a closed event. 1 In legal understanding this
attitude is exemplified in the ideology of originalism. Although this
attitude also can be enlightening to some degree, it ignores the effect
of the interpreter's own historical situatedness as a dimension of the
VOICE OF THE OTHER 83-116 (1997).
206. See GADAMER, supra note 6, at 352.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 355, 359.
209. See id. at 358-59.
210. See id. at 359-61.
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experience. Against these two inauthentic comportments, Gadamer
describes "the openness to tradition characteristic of historically
effected consciousness" as the mode of experience that best
facilitates humanistic understanding.21'
In authentic hermeneutic experience an interpreter acknowledges
that the tradition is not something to be examined from a distance
but is a lived source of understanding. "I must allow tradition's claim
to validity, not in the sense of simply acknowledging the past in its
otherness, but in such a way that it has something to say to me. '" 212
Genuine experience requires the actor to relinquish control over the
event. The methodology of hermeneutical appropriation is no more
and no less than remaining open to truths that are not the product of
one's own manipulative techniques. "The hermeneutical
consciousness culminates not in methodological sureness of itself,
but in the same readiness for experience that distinguishes the
experienced man from the man captivated by dogma. 21 3 Gadamer's
critique of the methodological consciousness of the natural sciences
leads him to articulate a broader conception of method appropriate
to hermeneutical understanding: holding oneself open and remaining
ready for experience.
Methodological openness to hermeneutical experience is not
exhausted by consciously subsuming one's subjective interests. An
experience has a continuing effect on the individual because it is the
subject of rhetorical articulation and evaluation. For example, an
individual who first lives and interacts with a member of a racial
minority in a college dormitory might have an authentic hermeneutic
experience by holding herself open and remaining ready for
experience. But this kind of experience is not a discrete event that
"ends." Years later, this experience plays a role in the individual's
dialogue with herself about affirmative action in higher education by
serving as a point of reference for rhetorical invention. Moreover, it
is accurate to say that the experience changes as a result of ongoing
rhetorical appropriation, since it is not a closed historical event in
physical time but a meaning-laden experience affecting the present.214
This "history of effects" is felt most strongly in the application of
211. Id. at 361.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 362.
214. Joseph Margolis develops this argument in defense of what he terms a "radical
historicism." See MARGOLIS, INTERPRETATION RADICAL, supra note 188; MARGOLIS, FLUX
OF HISTORY, supra note 188. Margolis contends that "sometimes, an interpretation of the past
alters the past without reversing time, without undoing the physical past," and that "history (and
the historical past) need not be 'finished' or 'closed'- in the sense in which the physical past is
closed." MARGOLIS, FLUX OF HISTORY, supra note 188, at 157-58 (emphasis in original).
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legal precedents and traditional narratives to present legal disputes,
an activity that Justice Souter characterizes as the "common law
method." Gadamer's methodology for obtaining rhetorical
knowledge is not just a matter of having genuine experiences, then,
but also requires an integration of these experiences into rhetorical
deliberations with others.
We are now in a position to appreciate the full depth and
complexity of Gadamer's use of "conversation" as a metaphor of
understanding. A conversation places heavy demands on the
participants to the extent that they are oriented toward mutual
understanding rather than seeking to manipulate the other for
strategic purposes. The colloquial phrase "we fell into conversation"
is revealing, since conversation is an unsettling experience that
disrupts each subject's pretense of control by bringing them outside
of their aims and prejudices. Because it is an experience,
conversation demands more than an attitude of polite listening. In
stressing that the requirements of a true conversation are not easily
met, Gadamer insists that
hermeneutic philosophy understands itself not as an absolute
position but as a way of experience. It insists that there is no
higher principle than holding oneself open in conversation. But
this means: Always recognize in advance the possible
correctness, even the superiority of the conversation partner's
position. Is this too little? Indeed, this seems to me to be the
kind of integrity that one can demand only of a professor of
philosophy. And one should demand as much. 15
Justice Souter approaches his judicial task in the spirit of
hermeneutical conversation. Far from idle chatter, this mode of
conversational understanding acknowledges the natural law
groundings of legal practice while simultaneously rendering the law
current by means of application and judgment.
Although a true conversation cannot be methodologically scripted
in advance, it would be a mistake to assume that conversations
cannot be facilitated and fostered. Gadamer's hermeneutical-
rhetorical philosophy and Justice Souter's substantive due process
jurisprudence represent different attempts to develop pragmatic aids
for cultivating the art of conversational understanding. Gadamer
claims that legal practice has exemplary significance for
hermeneutical philosophy for just this reason: The rules of thumb for
215. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, On the Origins of Philosophical Hermeneutics, in
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good judicial decisionmaking represent an important variation of a
more general postmodern hermeneutical methodology of
interpretation. Attentive to the factual singularity of the case at hand
while remaining cognizant of the tradition against which questions
arise, Justice Souter embodies the conversational character of
understanding.
Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics presents paradoxical
challenges to conventional legal theory. On the one hand he is a
postmodern thinker indebted to Heidegger's later philosophy, while
on the other hand he remains a philosopher in the classical sense. He
proposes a radical account of a universal hermeneutical situation, yet
he revives the classical natural law tradition. The concept of tradition
is central to his work, but he insists that understanding occurs only in
the unceasing dynamic of application. These paradoxes all reflect the
paradoxical experience of stability within flux, which is provisionally
secured through hermeneutical understanding and rhetorical
reasoning. Justice Souter confirms this insight from within legal
practice, providing a point of contact between Gadamer's philosophy
and social life. Although much work remains to be done to develop
in greater detail the connections that Gadamer makes between
philosophical hermeneutics, rhetorical philosophy, classical natural
law, and legal practice, simply acknowledging that the connections
exist is an important first step for legal theorists. In the end, there
may be no better acknowledgment within legal practice of these
connections than Justice Harlan's succinct wisdom concerning the
nature of legal decisionmaking that Justice Souter found to be so
persuasive. Hewing to tradition is essential to overcoming individual
hubris, Harlan believed, but it is also important never to forget that
the tradition is a living thing. Exploring this experience of law in flux,
which is the mainspring of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, is
the task of contemporary legal theory.
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